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In this Article we make the case for “movement law,” an approach to legal 
scholarship grounded in solidarity, accountability, and engagement with grassroots 
organizing and left social movements. In contrast to law and social movements—a 
field of study that unpacks the relationship between lawyers, legal process, and social 
change—movement law is a methodology for scholars across substantive areas of 
expertise to draw on and work alongside social movements. We identify seeds for this 
method in the work of a growing number of scholars that are organically developing 
methods for movement law. We make the case that it is essential in this moment of 
crisis to cogenerate ideas alongside grassroots organizing that aims to transform our 
political, economic, social landscape. 
 
In articulating movement law as a methodology for undertaking and shifting 
the scholarly enterprise, we identify four methodological moves. First, movement law 
scholars attend to modes of resistance by social movements and local organizing. 
Attending to resistance is in itself significant for it meaningfully diversifies the voices 
and sources within legal scholarship. Second, movement law scholars work to 
understand the strategies, tactics, and experiments of resistance and contestation. By 
studying the range of strategies, tactics, and experiments—including but not limited to 
law reform campaigns—movement law scholars engage new pathways to and 
possibilities for justice. Third, movement law scholars shift their epistemes, away from 
courts and siloed legal expertise, and toward the stories, strategies, and histories of 
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social movements. Adopting the episteme of social movement horizons denaturalizes 
the status quo and allows more radical possibilities to emerge—beyond the status quo, 
and toward political, economic, social transformation. Fourth, movement law scholars 
embody an ethos of solidarity, collectivity, and accountability with left social 
movements, rather than a hierarchical or oppositional relationship. Writing in 
solidarity with the grassroots displaces the legal scholar as an individual expert and 
centers collective processes of ideation and struggles for social change.  
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Following the 2020 uprisings responding to the Minneapolis Police 
Department’s killing of George Floyd, it has never been more clear how ideas birthed 
in and by social movements are fundamental forces in law and politics in the United 
States.1 On the left2—our core field of focus—in the last decade, Occupy coined “the 
 
1 In this article, we define social movements as social scientists do: “a collective effort to 
change the social structure that uses extrainstitutional methods at least some of the time. Social 
movement organizations (SMOs) are formal organizations that attempt to implement 
movement goals.” Debra C. Minkoff, The Sequencing of Social Movements, 62 AMER. SOC. REV. 
779, 780 n.3 (1997) (citations omitted). 
2 This is not to say that social movements are only active or successful on the left. On the 
right, the Tea Party and more recent right-wing formations have revived nativist politics. See 
generally DANIEL MARTINEZ HOSANG & JOSEPH E. LOWNDES, PRODUCERS, PARASITES, 
PATRIOTS: RACE AND THE NEW RIGHT-WING POLITICS OF PRECARITY 3-4 (2020); Ilya 
Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 
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99%,” mobilized people disenchanted with growing economic inequality and 
corporate power, and laid a foundation for the deepening of anti-capitalist critique and 
democratic socialist politics.3 The Ferguson and Baltimore rebellions, combined with 
organizing by the Movement for Black Lives and a growing constellation of 
abolitionist organizations, have made anti-Blackness, white supremacy, and police 
violence core issues on the U.S. left.4 Young people are organizing for a “Green New 
Deal,” an ambitious response to the environmental crisis that is remaking climate 
change politics.5 Indigenous resistance from Hawaii to the Dakotas is connecting 
environmental justice to the revival of anti-colonialist and land politics.6 Through 
powerful strikes and direct action, labor militancy by nurses, teachers, and “rideshare” 
drivers has reawakened the centrality of worker power to social movements and 
transformation.7 This renewed social movement activity marks a profound shift after 
 
301 (2011) (discussing the Tea Party Movement’s use of “popular constitutionalism” to 
advance its cause). 
3 See Michael Levitin, The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-
street/395408/ (describing “how the debate over inequality sparked by Occupy has radically 
remade the Democratic Party.”). 
4 The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) is a coalition of over 50 organizations representing 
thousands of Black people that came together to author A Vision for Black Lives. THE 
MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, A VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: POLICY DEMANDS FOR 
BLACK POWER, FREEDOM & JUSTICE (2016), https://neweconomy.net/resources/vision-
black-lives-policy-demands-black-power-freedom-and-justice; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a 
Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 407-10, 412-13, 415-16 (2018) [hereinafter 
Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination] (describing the M4BL, its vision, and its impact). On the 
vision for transformative reforms emerging from the Movement for Black Lives, see Marbre 
Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, Transformative Reforms, Abolitionist Demands, Stanford Civil 
Rights Civil Liberties Law Journal (forthcoming 2020-2021).  
5 The Green New Deal is a wide-ranging set of proposals aimed at transforming our social, 
economic, and political order through programs that touch on health, labor, race, and 
economic inequality. See generally KATE ARONOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA 
COHEN, & THEA RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL 
3-7 (2019); RHIANA GUNN-WRIGHT & ROBERT HOCKETT, THE GREEN NEW DEAL (2019), 
https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/ncsite/new_conesnsus_gnd_14_pager.pdf; Emily Witt, 
The Optimistic Activists for a Green New Deal: Inside the Youth-led Singing Sunrise Movement, THE NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-optimistic-
activists-for-a-green-new-deal-inside-the-youth-led-singing-sunrise-movement; H.R. Res. 109, 
116th Congress (1st Sess. 2019). 
6 See generally THE RED NATION, PREAMBLE TO THE RED NATION’S PRINCIPLES OF UNITY 
RATIFIED BY THE FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF FREEDOM COUNCILS IN ALBUQUERQUE  
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://therednation.org/manifesto/principles-of-unity/. 
7 See ERIC BLANC, RED STATE REVOLT: THE TEACHERS’ STRIKE WAVE AND WORKING-
CLASS POLITICS 1-14, 18-19 (2019); Jane McAlevey, Teachers Are Leading the Revolt Against 
Austerity, THE NATION (May 9, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/teachers-are-
leading-the-revolt-against-austerity/; Veena Dubal, Why the Uber Strike Was a Triumph, SLATE 
(May 10, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/uber-strike-victory-drivers-
network.html. 
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decades of relative quiet. Through a series of interconnected organic and organized 
interventions, today’s social movements are meeting the existential crises of our time 
with vision, scale, and infrastructure. They reflect the growing sense that neoliberal 
law and politics has failed the majority of Americans. And they help point the way 
toward transformation. 
 
In this Article, we argue that legal scholars should take seriously the 
epistemological universe of today’s left social movements, their imaginations, 
experiments, tactics, and strategies for legal and social change. In particular, we identify 
and defend a growing methodology in legal scholarship, one that cogenerates legal 
meaning and frameworks for critique alongside social movements and nascent 
formations of people organizing together against the status quo and for a more equal, 
just, and sustainable future for us all. This particular moment of political, economic, 
and social crisis demands that more of us adopt such an approach—a methodology 
we call “movement law.”  
 
Movement law is not the study of social movements; rather it is investigation 
and analysis with social movements. Social movements are the partners of movement 
law scholars rather than their subject. For at least three decades, legal scholars have 
studied social movements, creating a “law and social movements” subdiscipline.8 We 
are inspired by this work, but we aim to articulate something distinct, a methodology 
for legal scholars across areas of law.  
 
Movement law approaches scholarly thinking and writing about law, justice, 
and social change as work done in solidarity with social movements, local organizing, 
and other forms of collective struggle. As it begins in solidarity, it often begins outside 
of the law in a traditional sense. Movement law scholars join prefigurative efforts 
toward justice, freedom, and other ideals that the law claims, yet has failed to achieve. 
In this way, movement law builds on the work of jurisprudential schools of thought 
such as critical legal studies (CLS), critical race theory (CRT), LatCrit, feminist legal 
theory, critical lawyering, and democratic constitutionalism. Scholars in these critical 
traditions have long complicated conventional accounts of law, what it does and for 
 
8 See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 1554, 1556 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements]; Scott 
L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 360-63 (2018) 
[hereinafter Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law]. But see Edward L. Rubin, Passing 
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 48 
(2001) (arguing that in legal scholarship, “[v]ery little is said about the existence of social 
movements; their formation, operation, continuation, and decline . . . there is virtually no 
discussion of their internal management, their use of protest, or even the development of their 
litigation and law reform efforts.”). The extant literature offers second order explanations for 
the invocation of social movements in both public interest lawyering and in legal scholarship, 
more generally. In this article, we seek to explore the implications and possibilities of social 
movement ideation across a broad range of fields of legal scholarship, perhaps best understood 
as an understudied first order manifestation of the influence of movements. 
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whom, and how it can and should change, with an eye toward collective struggle and 
ideation.9 As Chuck Lawrence has recently underscored, CRT teaches us that “[a]ll 
race reform, all racial justice, is achieved through the work of people who join together 
in justice movements to disrupt systems and institutions of plunder and to contest the 
racialized narratives that justify that plunder.”10 Movement law centers itself within 
this history of critical thought and this understanding of the place of legal scholarship 
in the scheme of legal and social change. 
 
We are interested in social movements for their potential to democratize and 
transform our politics, and embolden our visions for change. Social movements exist 
on all sides of the political spectrum. Indeed, scholars across the ideological and 
political spectrum might use movement law.  But for us, because our own solidarity is 
borne of a shared commitment to a certain understanding of social, political, and 
economic justice, our focus is on left movements today: those that aim to redistribute 
life chances and resources; those that aim to end our reliance on prisons and police to 
solve political, economic, and social problems; those that confront systems of white 
supremacy, anti-Blackness, capitalism, ableism, cisnormativity, and heteropatriarchy; 
and those that struggle to fundamentally transform state and society. Those that posit 
wholesale transformation rather than simple reform as their end goal. Those that 
challenge elite rule and aim to build democracy from the ground up. Those focused 
on collective rather than individual well-being.11 Collectivity—across race, class, 
gender, sexuality, disability, and social location—leads to solidarity, and that is what 
both threatens the status quo and promises to profoundly shift our modes of living 
into ones that are more sustainable vis-a-vis the planet, and more equitable vis-a-vis 
each other.  
 
Today’s movements are raising deep questions about the propriety of 
capitalism and the histories of enslavement and colonialism that continue to define 
our social compact. The United States has always operated in a democratic deficit, a 
country beholden to the powerful few and dedicated to property rights tied to 
conceptions of individualized freedom.12 In working first to protect the market, the 
 
9 See infra Part I. 
10 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy and the 
Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 387 (2015). 
11 Cf. Daniel Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1937-39 (2019) 
(defending a focus on left practices of legal resistance by connecting larger critical viewpoints 
born on the left to the political power of resistance lawyering itself). 
12 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court 2019 Term—Foreword: The Degradation of 
American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10, 135-46 (2020); AZIZ RANA, THE 
TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 189-93 (2010). There is a growing and dynamic body 
of work in legal scholarship investigating these histories and their ongoing presence in the law. 
See, e.g., K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1880-87 (2019) 
(explaining the concept of self-deportation as a state tool for subjugation); Maggie Blackhawk, 
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1796, 1791-1800 
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state allows elites to hoard capital and exploit labor through and against law, 
concentrating resources and life chances at the top.13 But Occupy, Black Lives Matter, 
and the Standing Rock Water Protectors have reminded us of the circular rather than 
linear nature of history, the ongoing centrality of indigenous genocide and anti-Black 
violence—and the ongoing power of people’s resistance to shaping the country.14 
 
In calling for movement law, we argue that legal scholars invested in 
democracy; political, economic, and social justice, including racial and gender justice; 
large-scale redistribution of resources; and substantive equality should be generating 
ideas alongside social movements. That is because grassroots social movements have 
marshaled some of the most profound changes in how we relate to one another and 
what we can expect of the state.15 In times of crisis like ours, radical visions—where 
the scale of the vision matches the scale of the problems we face—can capture our 
imagination and change what we think is possible, both within and outside of the 
law. Social movements and other forms of collective struggle break the molds of 
political discourse, project new possible futures, and create new terrains of 
engagement. The visions of movement actors and organizations point us toward new 
forms of reconstruction, remaking the world in more fundamentally just ways. Social 
movements galvanize hope and collective action rather than cynicism and alienation 
in a way that can guide people to face the historically rooted material crises of our time. 
 
(2019) (arguing for the centrality of federal Indian law to the shaping of U.S. public law more 
broadly); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-9 
(2019) (describing continuities between historical abolition movements and the prison 
abolition movement of today); see also Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 650, 655 (2020) (describing the relationship between policing and the reproduction of 
residential segregation). 
13 See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (2007) (“Racism, specifically, is the state-
sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to 
premature death.”); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (the 
primary role of the state is to “set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures” 
required for the stability of private property, free trade, and markets); David Singh Grewal & 
Jedidiah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6-8 (2014) 
(neoliberalism’s key precepts include “strong property rights and private contracting rights are 
the best means to increase overall welfare”). 
14 E.g., NICK ESTES, OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE: STANDING ROCK VERSUS THE DAKOTA 
ACCESS PIPELINE, AND THE LONG TRADITION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE 169-99 (2019) 
(connecting the movement at Standing Rock to the long arc of Indigenous resistance in the 
Americas). 
15 See generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING 
TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 1-4 (2nd ed. 2007) (documenting the 
power of on-the-ground organizing in Mississippi during the civil rights movement); TOMIKO 
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1-5 (2011); MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF 
ABOLITION 1-5 (2016). 
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Social movements do not simply inspire; they also embody dynamic theories and 
practices of social and legal change. 
Legal scholarship—adjacent to the normative and coercive power of the 
state—will contribute to shaping the road ahead. Scholars are writing and studying 
with renewed curiosity the history of enslavement and colonialism; capitalism and 
white supremacy; race, class, and political economy.16 Contemporary and historical 
social movements are an important part of left intellectual traditions and 
commitments.17 Building off of this, we argue for scholarly experimentation, ideation, 
and collaboration that recognizes the extent of the crises that face the nation and the 
world, and the powerful contributions of social movements to represent those who 
are often locked out of formal political process. From where we stand, legal scholars 
should bring social movement ideas, strategies, and tactics into legal scholarship to 
ground our debates and clarify the stakes. We should bring the grassroots into 
scholarship in the hopes of challenging systemic exclusion, altering relations of power, 
 
16 See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, & K. Sabeel 
Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 
129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1786-94 (2020) (arguing that political economy should be central to legal 
scholarship); Park, supra note 12, at 1879-96 (bringing histories of settler colonialism to bear 
on the current concept of “self-deportation”); Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People 
to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 
131-32, 138-39, 158, 163-64 (2017) (describing the evolution of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as a way of facilitating police violence against Black people); Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Unsettling History, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1078-84 (2018) (reviewing KELLY LYTLE 
HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE OF HUMAN 
CAGING IN LOS ANGELES (2017)) (arguing that attending to the narratives of those directly 
affected by the system—the “rebel archive”—can help uncover “the interconnected nature of 
governmental oppression”); Katie R. Eyer, The New Jim Crow is the Old Jim Crow, 128 YALE L.J. 
1002, 1005-06 (2019) (reviewing ELIZABETH GILLESPIE MCRAE, MOTHERS OF MASSIVE 
RESISTANCE: WHITE WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY (2018), JEANNE 
THEOHARIS, A MORE BEAUTIFUL AND TERRIBLE HISTORY: THE USES AND MISUSES OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY (2018)) (citing a “growing body of work by historians of the South 
and of the civil rights movement” that “demonstrates that there is far less discontinuity 
between the past and the present than we might like to believe”).  
17 See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A 
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, 87-93, 109-23, 126-28 (Russell & Russell 1962) (1935); 
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22-30, 37-39 (2003); CIVIL RIGHTS 
CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE NEGRO 
PEOPLE 25-28 (William L. Patterson ed., Int’l Publishers 1970) (1951); FRANTZ FANON, 
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS vii-ix, 110-11 (Charles Lam Markman trans., Pluto Press 1986) 
(1952); Ida B. Wells, Lynch Law in America, in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 70-76 (Beverly Guy-Sheftal ed., 1995). 
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avoiding cooptation, and collaborating with our students and colleagues seeking to 
understand how to change in the world. 
When we speak of producing scholarship in solidarity and conversation with 
movements, we do not mean to limit our solidarity to currently existing, full-fledged 
social movements. Instead, we focus more broadly: on collectives of people struggling 
together to generate new ideas and ways of living together, whether they are current 
or historical, and whether they are social movements, social movement organizations, 
fledgling formations of community members in struggle, local organizing groups, or 
labor organizations old and new, formal and informal. Although these formations may 
not yet meet Charles Tilly’s definition of a social movement that provides a “sustained 
challenge to power holders,” they possess the promise to get there.18 We use the term 
“movement” because of the collective strength and potential for transformative 
change that it implies, and because we see these visions, experiments, campaigns, 
tactics, as in fact interrelated and part of a larger movement ecosystem 
  The scholarly methodology of movement law is related to but distinct from the 
practice of movement lawyering, an approach to lawyering in solidarity with social 
movements.19 Movement lawyering aims to reorient public interest practice away from 
traditional subject matter siloes and uni-modal advocacy approaches toward the frames 
and strategies generated by grassroots movements.20 In contrast, with movement law, 
 
18 Compare Charles Tilly, From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements, in HOW SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS MATTER 253, 257 (Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam & Charles Tilly eds., 1999) 
(defining a social movement as “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a 
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public 
displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment”), with Minkoff, 
supra note 1, at 780 n.3 (defining social movements as simply “a collective effort to change the 
social structure that uses extra-institutional methods at least some of the time”). 
19 For works on law and organizing and movement lawyering, see, e.g., Kate Andrias & 
Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political 
Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 1, 26-33 (forthcoming 2020); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, 
A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447-50 (2001); Jennifer 
Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle 
for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 446 (1995); Alexi Nunn Freeman & Jim 
Freeman, It’s About Power, Not Policy: Movement Lawyering for Large-Scale Social Change, 23 
CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 161-66 (2016); Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social 
Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 26-28, 33-59 (2011); Betty Hung, Law and 
Organizing From the Perspective of Organizers: Finding a Shared Theory of Social Change, 1 L.A. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 4, 7-23 (2009); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for 
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 455, 464-79 (1994); Joseph 
Phelan, Purvi & Chuck: Community Lawyering, ORGANIZING UPGRADE (JUNE 1, 2010, 7:20 
AM), http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/modules-menu/community-
organizing/item/71-purvi-amp-chuck-community-lawyering. 
20 See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILLINOIS L. REV. 1645, 1689-1716 
(2017) (“[M]ovement lawyering is the mobilization of law through deliberately planned and 
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our focus is on creating space within legal scholarship to think alongside social 
movements. To be sure, these practices are mutually reinforcing and many movement 
law scholars engage in movement lawyering, as well. But in this Article, we give 
sustained attention to scholarly method. 
  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we ground the methodology of 
movement law in both the urgency of our current moment and past innovations in 
legal scholarship. In Part II, we turn to our own methodology and sketch out four 
moves that together form what we see as a distinct and emergent strand of movement 
law scholarship. The moves are (a) locating resistance; (b) thinking alongside strategies, 
tactics, and experiments for justice; (c) shifting epistemes; and (d) adopting a 
solidaristic stance. These four moves may not exist in every piece of movement law 
scholarship. But the moves build on and deepen each other, resulting in scholarship 
that we believe has the potential to contribute to political, economic, and social 
transformation. In Part III, we examine the place of movement law within conceptions 
of normative legal scholarship, recognizing that movement law may carry certain 
dangers, for example of losing objectivity or lacking rigor. Moreover, there are risks of 
fetishizing or feeling beholden to particular social movements such that one is no 
longer able to access scholarly detachment. While these risks are real, we believe we 
can overcome them with vigilance and reflexivity, and that Movement Law is a 
necessary form of legal epistemology in our current crisis. We conclude in Part IV by 
identifying movement law as a potential bulwark against the traditionally 
conservative pull of elite discourse, a means of incrementally advancing legal 
thought toward the support of radical alternatives. 
 
I.  Responding to the Crisis of Our Times 
 We are living in a moment of possibility—where the failures of the state to 
provide for people are plain and where grassroots contestation of the status quo is 
stronger than it has been in decades. As scholars, we have an opportunity to respond 
to today’s crises in ways that move us toward more justice and more liberation for 
more people. In this Part, we identify this as an important moment of opportunity, 
name earlier currents in legal scholarship working alongside movements, and make a 
normative case for such work within today’s overlapping crises and possibilities.  
The global COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the failures of the neoliberal 
social contract, particularly its emphasis on the individual, property, profit, and the 
market economy. While these failures have resonated in different ways around the 
globe, they have reverberated in a particular way in the United States, the most 
 
interconnected advocacy strategies, inside and outside of formal law-making spaces, by 
lawyers who are accountable to politically marginalized constituencies to build the power of 
those constituencies to produce and sustain democratic social change goals that they define.” 
Id. at 1690). 
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powerful country on earth. Tens of millions of Americans are without work—and as 
a result many lack health care, experience food insecurity, and face eviction.21 Nearly 
1.5 million people are behind bars, where the virus spreads even more quickly.22 Local, 
state, and federal governments have failed to respond to a crisis that requires 
coordination, collaboration, and an orientation toward meeting human need. All of 
this disproportionately devastates Black and brown communities, as well as poor white 
people.23  
In April 2020, writer Arundhati Roy described the COVID-19 pandemic as a 
“portal:” “a gateway between one world and the next.”24 Through the portal, Roy 
evoked the possibility of meeting the various crises exacerbated by the pandemic by 
building new modes of response. In fact, the pandemic has heightened people’s 
resistance and practices of survival. Uprisings, organizing, protests, campaigns, policy 
platforms, bail funds, and mutual aid networks have taken hold all over the country—
speaking directly to the failures of prevailing political, economic, legal, and social 
arrangements, and offering alternative imaginations of what the world might look like 
and the strategies, tactics, and prefigurations that might get us there.25  
Just weeks after Roy invoked the concept of the portal in relation to the 
pandemic, uprisings in response to the police killing of George Floyd expanded that 
portal and its possibilities: through their placards and their demands, people on the 
streets brought attention to the structural dimension of police violence and linked the 
state’s failures to provide health care for all to the state’s investments in policing.26 
Social movement organizations called to defund the police and invest in Black 
 
21 See Yun Li, Nearly Half the U.S. Population is Without a Job, Showing How Far the Labor Recovery 
Has to Go, CNBC (June 30, 2020, 9:48 AM EDT), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/29/nearly-half-the-us-population-is-without-a-job-
showing-how-far-the-labor-recovery-has-to-go.html. 
22 See Emily Widra & Dylan Hayre, Failing Grades: States’ Responses to COVID-19 in Jails & 
Prisons, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (June 25, 2020) 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/failing_grades.html. 
23 See, e.g., Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The Black Plague, NEW YORKER (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-black-plague. 
24 Arundhati Roy, The Pandemic is a Portal, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/10d8f5e8-74eb-11ea-95fe-fcd274e920ca (“We can choose to 
walk through it, dragging the carcasses of our prejudice and hatred, our avarice, our data banks 
and dead ideas, our dead rivers and smoky skies behind us. Or we can walk through lightly, 
with little luggage, ready to imagine another world. And ready to fight for it.”). 
25 E.g., Jia Tolentino, What Mutual Aid Can Do During a Pandemic, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/18/what-mutual-aid-can-do-during-a-
pandemic. 
26 See Intercepted with Jeremy Scahill, The Rebellion Against Racial Capitalism, THE INTERCEPT 
(June 24, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/the-rebellion-against-racial-
capitalism/ (interviewing Robin D.G. Kelley, who underscores that the “portal” emerged from 
a growing realization that the violence of racialized policing is intertwined with structural 
neglect and racialized capitalism). 
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communities.27 And the public responded, with unprecedented numbers of people 
taking to the streets, and a massive spike in contributions to community bail funds.28  
We are amidst a moment then of great suffering and great possibility—what 
comes next is uncertain.29 A vaccine will likely arrive to quell the spread of COVID-
19, but the devastation of the pandemic will stay with us, as will the incredible rise in 
movement energy and public receptiveness to structural understandings of the 
collective problems we face. To the extent that we are writing and producing 
scholarship, we should speak to the crises of our time with boldness and honesty, and 
in solidarity with grassroots movements, working class people, and directly impacted 
communities. We should labor in service of that other world, the one we can only 
build if we work together. There is some tradition of such scholarship in law, to which 
we turn next. 
 
A. Critical Race Theory as Cornerstone  
 
We are not the first to try to meet the demands of contemporary crises through 
legal scholarship. We are inspired by scholars who have cogenerated ideas with social 
movements in the past, germinating the methodology that we call movement law. 
Here, we name some of those scholars, with a focus on an oft-unrecognized 
connection between Critical Race Theory and social movements.30 This is not a 
 
27 See Amna A. Akbar, How Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (June 
15, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-
disband-became-the-demands/; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-
abolish-defund-police.html. 
28 Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May be the Largest 
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-
size.html; Jia Tolentino, Where Bail Funds Go From Here, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-activism/where-bail-funds-go-from-here; 
Nicholas Kulish, Bail Funds, Flush with Cash, Learn to ‘Grind Through this Horrible Process’, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/business/bail-funds.html; 
Mary Hooks & Jocelyn Simonson, The Power of Community Bail Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/23/opinion/bail-funds.html.  
29 “When a conjuncture unrolls, there is no ‘going back’. History shifts gears. The terrain 
changes. You are in a new moment. You have to attend, ‘violently’, with all the ‘pessimism of 
the intellect’ at your command, to the ‘discipline of the conjuncture.’” Stuart Hall, Gramsci and 
Us, VERSO BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017) (discussing ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE 
PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1971)), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2448-stuart-hall-
gramsci-and-us) (internal quotations omitted). 
30 Almost 20 years ago, Sumi Cho and Robert Westley contested the prevailing mode of 
locating CRT primarily within debates of the legal academy, and located additional origins in 
“actual resistance movements.” See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key 
Movements that Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1378-80, 1408-13 (2000) 
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comprehensive account of the scholarly roots of movement law—naming the 
sprawling antecedents that go back a century at least would be its own project.31 We 
would include Legal Realism,32 Critical Legal Studies,33 the various formations of 
 
(“ground[ing] CRT in actual resistance movements” and arguing that CRT’s core 
commitments include “community formation and social transformation.”); see also Sumi K. 
Cho, Essential Politics, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 433, 434-36 (1997). 
31 Scott Cummings has charted an original and interdisciplinary intellectual history of the role 
of social movements in legal theory in two articles that gravitate around the law/politics divide 
in progressive legal thought and the rise and fall of legal liberalism over the course of the 
twentieth century. See generally Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8; 
Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, supra note 8. 
32 Although the story of legal realism is contested and complex, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 733-35 (2009), at base it was an intellectual 
movement that sought to make adjudication and legal scholarship less rule-bound and more 
permeable to the influence of evolving social facts and norms. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993). 
33 Critical Legal Studies theorists, such as Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, and Karl Klare, 
advanced a sharp critique of doctrine and adjudication as a particularly constraining exercise 
of politics that ultimately defeated and demoralized movements for change. See, e.g., Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1775 (1976) 
(“[L]itigants who have mastered the language of form can dominate and oppress others, or 
perhaps simply prosper because of it; academics without number hitch their wagonloads of 
words to the star of technicality.”); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 579 (1983) (“Modern legal doctrine . . . exists in a cultural 
context in which . . . society is understood to be made and imagined rather than merely given. 
To incorporate the final level of legal analysis in this new setting would be to transform legal 
doctrine into one more arena for continuing the fight over the right and possible forms of 
social life.”); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266-67, 270-85 (1978) (using the Wagner Act 
to describe how law ultimately preserved hierarchies and distributions of power); see also THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 3-4 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
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“outsider jurisprudence”34 (including LatCrit35 and feminist legal theory36), popular and 
democratic constitutionalism,37 law and society scholarship,38 critical legal history,39 
 
34 See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2322 (1989) (“[O]utsider jurisprudence—jurisprudence derived from 
considering stories from the bottom—will help resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflicts of 
value and doctrine that characterize liberal thought.”); Francisco Valdes, Commentary, Identity 
Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377, 
382 (2002) (describing the “continuing evolution of outsider jurisprudence”). 
35 See generally Margaret E. Montoya, Introduction: LatCrit Theory: Mapping Its Intellectual and Political 
Foundations and Future Self-Critical Directions, 53 U. MIA. L. REV. 1119 (1999); Francisco Valdes, 
Foreword: Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Crossover Dreams: 
The Roots of LatCrit Theory in Chicana/o Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 
(1999); Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, An Assessment of LatCrit Theory Ten Years After, 83 
IND. L.J. 1151 (2008); Ediberto Roman, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable 
Hurdles and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369 (2002); Pedro A. 
Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L.J. 387 (2002); Robert S. Chang, “Forget the Alamo”: Race Courses as a Struggle over 
History and Collective Memory, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 113 (2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial 
Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. & B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L. REV. 477 (1998); John Hayakawa Török, The Story of “Towards Asian American 
Jurisprudence” and Its Implications for Latinas/os in American Law Schools, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 271 (2002).  
36 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999). Of 
course queries of race and gender are interrelated, and there are many works exploring and 
theorizing their intersections in critique and struggle. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Foreword to the 
Second Edition, of CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER, xiii, xiv (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 
2d ed., 2003); Kristin Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 131, 139 (2010) (theorizing “social justice feminism” as drawing from feminist legal theory 
and critical race feminism, but “emerg[ing] from practice”); Martha Chamallas, Social Justice 
Feminism: A New Take on Intersectionality, FREEDOM CTR. J., Fall 2014, at 11, 11 (identifying 
“social justice feminism” as a “new take on intersectionality theory and intersectional 
feminism”); Sumi Cho, Intersectionality and the Third Reconstruction, FREEDOM J. CTR. J., Fall 2014, 
at 21, 21 (locating “the origins of both the early and modern women’s movements in Black 
freedom struggles”). 
37 One premise of democratic constitutionalism is that social movement contestation over 
legal meaning is not simply integral to stories of constitutional change, but rather essential to 
the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1418 
(2006). Reva Siegel made the connection clear when she wrote that “[s]ocial movement 
conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms of 
constitutional understanding.” Id. at 1323. See generally 1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, 
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 
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MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, 
Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: 
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1470 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1367 (2011).  
38 The Law and Society tradition accentuates the importance of law in action (rather than 
simply law on the books). See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Sociological Jurisprudence Past and Present, 45 L. 
& SOC. INQUIRY 493, 505-11 (2020) (tracing research on “law in action” from sociological 
jurisprudence at the turn of the twentieth century to Legal Realism during the New Deal Era 
and Law and Society in the 1960s). It also highlights everyday legalism (rather than  
court-centered litigation). See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and 
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731, 736-43 (1992) 
(describing the law as it shapes and appears in the daily lives of ordinary citizens including 
interactions with family and neighbors); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social 
Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 AM. J. SOC. 1328, 1339-40, 1355-58 (2003) 
(finding that people rarely seek remedies for their legal problems through the formal legal 
system and instead “disrupt” and “resist” outside of the legal system in order to resolve their 
issues); Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990) (focusing on the welfare poor, for whom 
the law is “repeatedly encountered in the most ordinary transactions and events”); Susan S. 
Silbey & Austin Sarat, Commentary, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 165, 165-66, 172-73 (1987) (highlighting the lack of distinction between “law” and 
“society” in daily life, especially for those in rural and/or working class communities who 
“construct their own local universe of legal values and behavior”). Law and society scholars 
such as Stuart Scheingold, Joel Handler, and Michael McCann have more directly wrestled 
with the relationship between law and social movements. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE 
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 13-21 (2d ed. 
2004) (arguing that the “myth of rights” legitimated the social arrangements that yielded social 
and economic inequality); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1-14 (1978) (surveying the 
influence of social movements on the development of law and legal reform in four areas: 
environmentalism, consumer protection, civil rights, and social welfare); MICHAEL W. 
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION 12 (1994) (arguing that “the legal mobilization framework . . . encourages us 
to focus on how, when, and to what degree legal practices tend to be both [a resource and a 
constraint] at the same time”). See generally CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). Finally, litigation skeptics such as Gerald 
Rosenberg have provoked responses from, amongst others, law and society scholars regarding 
the efficacy of legal claims in the advancement of progressive causes. Compare GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 1-3, 157 
(2d ed. 2008) (advancing the backlash thesis in his analysis of the impact of Brown v. Board of 
Education and Roe v. Wade on social movements), with Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, 
Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1237-40 (2010) (disputing the backlash 
thesis in the context of the same-sex marriage movement in California), Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945-47 (2011) (proposing that litigation loss may 
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labor scholarship,40 and more.41 Instead, our goal here is to identify themes in past 
works by a small group of critical scholars who have emphasized collective struggle, 
organizing, movements, or the experiences of marginalized people in their work. In 
many ways, these are our forebears. The work of these Critical Race Theorists 
demonstrates the value of legal scholarship when it shifts epistemologies through 
stances of solidarities with the experiences of outsiders, and it paves the way for our 
argument in Part I(B) that legal scholarship should engage movement visions. That the 
scholars we highlight center questions of race, racialization, and racial justice is also 
 
produce positive change for social movements and “lead to more effective reform strategies”), 
and Laura Beth Nielsen, Social Movements, Social Process: A Response to Gerald Rosenberg, 42 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 672 (2009) (arguing that Rosenberg “overstates the limits of litigation 
strategies for social change”). 
39 Legal historian Tomiko Brown-Nagin has documented how National Lawyers’ Guild 
attorney Len Holt and others worked with grassroots social movement organizations over the 
course of the long civil rights struggle, beyond the high-profile NAACP-LDF school 
desegregation campaign, with mixed success. TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO 
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 175-211 
(2011); see also KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 1-11 (2012) (though explicitly not a work about movements, Mack 
documents “a multiple biography of a group of African American lawyers” in order to 
“illustrate[] a larger narrative arc of American race relations”); SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING 
THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–1915, at 1-12 (2013) 
(recounting a history of legal civil rights activism and “situat[ing] this story within the broader 
scope of social movement theory and legal civil rights history”). 
40 See generally Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 561 (2014); Catherine L. Fisk & Diane S. Reddy, Protection by Law, Repression 
by Law: Bringing Labor Back into the Study of Law and Social Movements, 70 EMORY L.J. 63 (2020); 
Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle Over Wal-
Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502 (2008); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF 
THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); Karl Klare, Countervailing Workers’ Power as a 
Regulatory Strategy, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 63 (Hugh 
Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., 2000); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community 
Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. 
L. REV. 889 (1991); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685 (2008). 
41 Our understanding of co-generated legal meaning draws on the work of Robert Cover, as 
well. Cover set the jurisgenerative potential of interpretive communities against the jurispathic 
nature of courts. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1982). In addition, Ed Sparer offered an early analysis of 
the type of work we seek to do in this article: “the practical relationship of Critical legal theory 
to social movement and struggle in the United States today is, at best, very limited. . . [T]he 
absence of praxis in current Critical legal work seems to be one of its most marked features.” 
Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique 
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 553 (1984). Sparer goes on to argue, 
“Acting means struggling for and living a different way, even if only ‘experimentally,’ and this 
requires praxis, theory which guides and is in turn influenced by action.” Id. at 558. 
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central to their importance for thinking alongside today’s social movements—where 
questions of race are central. 
 
A product of the Civil Rights Movement and the Black power era,42 CRT 
scholars challenged narratives about Black, brown, and indigenous people to 
transform, in Charles Lawrence’s words, “the nomos of the larger social world in 
which we live.”43 Major early works were inspired by or in conversation with popular 
struggles.44 In the last few decades, CRT’s connection to social movements has receded 
as scholars have emphasized CRT’s central insights as being about the co-constitutive 
relationship between race, law, and inequality.45 While many founding scholars frame 
CRT as a product of the civil rights movement, they are less likely to frame CRT as an 
 
42 For various tellings of the origins, see, for example, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty 
Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1262-64 
(2011); Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1505, 1510-11 (2009); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of 
Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. L. REV. 329, 333 (2006); Cheryl I. Harris, 
Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1220-21 (2002); Introduction, in 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii, xiv 
(Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). CRT is more 
commonly remembered as a response to the lack of attention to race by CLS and the larger 
legal academy. Id. at xiii, xvi-xviii. 
43 Charles Lawrence III, Commentary, Listening for Stories in All the Right Places: Narrative and 
Racial Formation Theory, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 247, 252 (2012) (“When outsider racial groups tell 
stories, when we engage in the project of racial reconstruction, we seek not only to change the 
pejorative meanings assigned to our races, but also to transform the communal narrative that 
defines the nomos of the larger social world in which we live.”).  
44 E.g., Richard Delgado, Essay, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and 
Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2282-83, 2291, 2296 (2001) 
(contrasting “idealist” and “materialist” takes on race, reflecting briefly on the long civil rights 
movement, and describing the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle). Scholars 
of color also drew on their own experiences. See, e.g., Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 439-40 (1987) (“We learned from life as well as from books. We 
learned about injustice, social cruelty, political hypocrisy and sanctioned terrorism from the 
mouths of our mothers and fathers and from our very own experiences.”). 
45 E.g., Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014) (articulating the “key modernist claims” of CRT, with 
none focused on organizing, protest, or social movements); Devon W. Carbado, Afterword, 
Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1606-15 (2011) (discussing CRT as engaging in 
“organizational learning” demonstrated by civil rights movement organizations and CRT’s 
core focus on “how the law constructs whiteness” specifically and race and racism generally, 
without further reference to social movements). But c.f. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 387 
(articulating three lessons of CRT, with two focused on movements, e.g.: “All race reform, all 
racial justice, is achieved through the work of people who join together in justice movements 
to disrupt systems and institutions of plunder and to contest the racialized narratives that 
justify that plunder.”) 
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exercise of movement praxis beyond institutional fights within law schools.46 But it is 
this connection between CRT and movement imagining that inspires us now. 
 
We begin with Derrick Bell. Much of his work was animated by a commitment 
to social struggle and suffused with a sense of accountability to Black communities, 
even as he grappled with what he surmised was the permanence of anti-Black racism.47 
In Serving Two Masters, Bell critiqued the NAACP-LDF desegregation strategy out of 
fidelity to African American community groups and their parent-leaders.48 The parents 
took issue with LDF’s focus on the ideal of desegregation over the material quality of 
educational opportunities for Black children.49 Bell attributed the litigators’ 
unwillingness to recognize Black parents’ concerns about “the increasing futility of 
‘total desegregation’” in the face of massive resistance by whites to their embrace of 
“racial balance” as a central “symbol of the nation’s commitment to equal 
opportunity.”50 In contrasting the parents’ commitments to their children’s education 
with the focus of lawyers—as well as middle-class Black people and whites—on the 
symbolic domain, Bell critiqued one of the most venerated litigation strategies in our 
history.51 He disrupted accepted truths and showed how conceptions of justice can be 
contested from the grassroots. 
 
 
46 Cho & Westley, supra note 30, at 1378-80. Feminist legal theorists and Critical Race Theorists 
faced off with both Critical Legal Theory scholars (often white men) as well as the larger 
institutional forces of the mainstream legal academy. E.g., Robin West, Commentary, 
Deconstructing the CLS-FEM Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 85-86 (1986); Crenshaw, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1288-1300. 
47 E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM ix-xii (1992); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992) (“What 
was it about our reliance on racial remedies that may have prevented us from recognizing that 
abstract legal rights, such as equality, could do little more than bring about the cessation of 
one form of discriminatory conduct that soon appeared in a more subtle though no less 
discriminatory form?”; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 533 (1980) (“Criticism, as we in the 
movement for minority rights have every reason to learn, is a synonym for neither cowardice 
nor capitulation. It may instead bring awareness, always the first step toward overcoming still 
another barrier in the struggle for racial equality.”). 
48 For instance, Bell begins the article with a quotation from a coalition of community groups 
articulating their own, contrasting version of equity. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: 
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 470-71, 477-
78 (1976) (contrasting Black parents’ critiques about the failures of the litigation strategy to 
materially improve the “quality of the education available” with the NAACP-LDF’s focus on 
the “separate” prong of “separate but equal”). 
49 Id. at 483, 486-87. 
50 Id. at 488-89. 
51 See id. at 516 (describing how lawyers “sacrificed opportunities to negotiate with school 
boards and petition courts for the judicially enforceable educational improvements which all 
parents seek.”).  
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In turn, Mari Matsuda encouraged law scholars to look to “the actual 
experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color in America” 
as “a new epistemological source.”52 “Looking to the bottom”—to “those who have 
seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise”—would help scholars in “fathoming 
the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.”53 Matsuda studied 
campaigns for reparations by Japanese-Americans for internment during World War 
II, and by Native Hawaiians for the overthrow of Hawaiian rule and expropriation of 
indigenous land.54 For Matsuda, studying and supporting the organized struggles of 
people of color opened up possibilities of moving beyond critique to conceive of legal 
strategies that challenge the status quo.55 Reparations was a quintessential “critical 
legalism” from the bottom designed to “achieve and maintain the utopian vision.”56 
For decades now, Matsuda distilled brilliance born within collective struggle.57  
 
 In a parallel vein, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality attends to 
multiply constituted forms of oppression to deepen understanding of how the law 
 
52 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987). Matsuda explicitly issued her call in response to the Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) movement. Id. at 323. A more recent example of work examining the co-
constitutive nature of legal repression, organizing, and race is advanced by Ian F. Haney López. 
RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 228 (2004) (examining Chicano 
movement in Los Angeles during the late 1960s, and the emergence of new self-conceptions 
among young Chicanos of their racial identities as nonwhite).  
53 Matsuda, supra note52, at 324 (referring to oppressed people as “special voice[s] to which 
we should listen”). But cf. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2002) (contesting as insufficient CRT’s theorization of people at “the bottom”). For a further 
nuanced discussion of “looking to the bottom,” see MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. 
LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 
(1993) (noting that it is not enough to “simply tell the victim’s story;” we ought to “listen first 
to the voices of the victims of hate speech” because “[t]heir liberation must be the bottom 
line of any first amendment analysis”). 
54 Matsuda, supra note 52, at 362, 363-73 (concluding that “[t]he Native Hawaiian and Japanese-
American claims for reparations each represent emerging norms and social movements 
generated from the bottom.”). 
55 See id. at 324, 349; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1398-99 (1991) (arguing that 
“unmasking hidden centers and false objectivity is an important first step in producing a 
counter-ideology of antisubordination” and identifying “strategies [such] as affirmative action, 
reparations, and restriction of hate speech.”). 
56 Matsuda, supra note 52, at 362. 
57 For recent work building out these themes, see generally Mari Matsuda, The Next Dada 
Utopian Visioning Peace Orchestra: Constitutional Theory and the Aspirational, 62 MCGILL L.J. 1203, 
1245-46 (2017) [hereinafter Matsuda, The Next Dada]; Mari J. Matsuda, This Is (Not) Who We 
Are: Korematsu, Constitutional Interpretation, and National Identity, 128 YALE L.J.F. 657, 683  
(2019). 
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operates and a broader normative vision of what the law can be.58 Using 
intersectionality, legal scholars might “map[] the margins,”59 looking, for example, to 
how courts render invisible the experiences of Black women,60 or to how antiracist and 
feminist struggles fail to attend to the multiple marginalization of women of color.61 
While organizing and social movements are points of departure for Crenshaw, rather 
than her exclusive or even primary focus, to this day, she grounds many of her 
interventions in social movements and organizing—for example, through her 
launching of the #SayHerName campaign that we discuss in Part II.62 
 
Building off this work, Lani Guinier’s and Gerald Torres’s work demonstrates 
how new legal and political understandings can and do emerge from collective 
imagining, especially within organizing and social movements.63 Guinier and Torres 
focus on how multiracial groups led by people of color critique the legal, social, and 
political structures around them, and experiment with political work that “enlarge[s] 
the idea of what is possible.”64 They illuminate how social movements can generate 
and shift ideas about constitutional and legal interpretation from the ground up, what 
they term “demosprudence.”65 Although theirs is a theory of legal and social change 
rooted in historical examples and focused on democracy, the lessons for scholars 
inspired by Guinier and Torres are clear: that scholars must be part of “a commitment 
 
58See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 
139, 145 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing] (describing the expansion of a “normative 
vision” through intersectional analysis of anti-discrimination statutes); Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1241, 1243-44 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins] (“[E]xploring the 
various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural, political, and 
representational aspects of violence against women of color.”). 
59 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 58, at 1243-44 (“[T]he experiences of women of 
color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . these 
experiences tend not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or 
antiracism.”). 
60 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 58, at 148-50; see also Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound! 
1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 542. 
61 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 58, at 1264-82. 
62 Id. at 1299 (“[R]ecognizing [how] . . . the intersectional experiences of women of color are 
marginalized in prevailing conceptions of identity politics does not require that we give up 
attempts to organize as communities of color. Rather, intersectionality provides a basis for 
reconceptualizing race as a coalition between men and women of color.”); see also Part II(d), 
infra. 
63 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11-22 (2002). 
64 Id. at 37. 
65 See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law 
and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749-50 (2014) (“[D]emosprudence focuses on the 
ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can permanently . . . chang[e] the people 
who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”).  
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not only to struggle but also to struggle toward a larger vision.”66 They encourage us 
that “[j]ust outcomes will emerge, we believe, from experiments in democratic 
process.”67 
 
The potential of scholarship that centers social movements and grassroots 
contestation is clear beyond CRT as well.68 Consider some examples. Catharine 
MacKinnon participated in feminist organizing and consciousness raising as she 
produced her most significant works in feminist theory.69 Lucie White engaged in a 
dialectic between critical theory and the experiences of the most marginalized, 
illuminating how law can both facilitate and repress their power.70 Gerald López called 
 
66 GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 63, at 159. 
67 Id. at 158. 
68 Early critical lawyering theorists drew on the disillusion with legal liberalism to push public 
interest lawyers to think in more complex ways about power. We use the term critical lawyering 
to encompass a broad range of practices described and advanced in legal scholarship, including 
rebellious lawyering, political lawyering, collaborative lawyering, and community lawyering. See 
Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 
119 (2009) (arguing that progressive lawyers “measure success by how practice raises political 
consciousness, motivates and strengthens client activity and supports effective grassroots 
activism generally.”). Scott Cummings has empirically substantiated the content of critical 
lawyering across sectors in closely observed case studies of legal mobilization campaigns in 
Los Angeles in the 2000s. SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE 
STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES (forthcoming 2020). Martha Mahoney, John Calmore, and 
Stephanie Wildman provide another key resource on critical lawyering across subject areas: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 1-
2, 5 (2d ed. 2013). Especially generative work on critical lawyering can be found in scholarship 
on the struggle for environmental justice. See, e.g., LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM 
THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE MOVEMENT 1 (2001).  
69 MACKINNON, supra note 36, at ix-xvii; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION xii (1976); see also 
Robin L. West, Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 389-90 (2005) (laying out 
Catharine MacKinnon’s legal theory and describing her “ethical imperative” to stay grounded 
in the actual experiences of women); cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585-86 (1990) (engaging feminist movements and Black women’s 
organizing as points of departure in her engagement with feminist legal theory, and in 
particular in arguing against gender essentialism within MacKinnon’s and West’s works).  
70 See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 538 (1987-88) (theorizing the potential of social 
welfare litigation to serve as a space in which those who have been aggrieved by actions of the 
state might educate themselves and engage in participatory activities that defy their 
powerlessness); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and 
Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 700-01 [hereinafter White, To Learn and Teach] (drawing from a 
South African case study to describe coordinated law and organizing that leads to the 
politicization of problems in community and subsequent concerted social action); Lucie E. 
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 
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for lawyers to work collaboratively with community members, to accompany rather 
than to lead, to learn rather than wield professional privilege, and to define success 
through collective work rather than litigation wins.71 LatCrit scholars emphasized the 
importance of the collective and of solidarity from within legal education.72 These 
scholars, and many more, have charted how legal scholarship can build a more just, 
equal, and democratic world, through a grounded understanding of power’s operations 
and through solidarity with those closest to the problems of our world. Many of these 
scholars wrote about movements and organizing in which they participated, within 
communities from which they came.  
  
The critical scholars that we name each operated within their own historical crises.73 
Today, we write in a different era. While we make this call for movement law within a 
 
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990) (examining how race, gender, and class operate to construct norms 
that render speech in procedural settings as deviant, with a now canonical focus on Mrs. G, a 
poor, Black, woman client who defies those norms to speak truth to power); Lucie E. White 
& Jeremy Perelman, Introduction to STONES OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM 
HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 4 (2011) (Lucie E. White & Jeremy 
Perelman eds., 2011) (discussing case studies that illuminate “activists’ consciousness about 
their tactics, calculations, expectations, theories of change, and motivating values.”). 
71 GERALD LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE 
LEGAL PRACTICE 7-8 (1992); Gerald P. López, Transform—Don’t Just Tinker With—Legal 
Education (pt. 1), 24 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 285 (2018) (“The problem solving at the heart of 
all lawyering inevitably responds to and deploys power.”); see also Bill Ong Hing, Coolies, James 
Yen, and Rebellious Advocacy, 14 ASIAN AMER. L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (“We should be collaborators: 
working within rather than simply on behalf of clients and allies from whom we have much to 
learn.”); Ascanio Piomelli, Rebellious Heroes, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 283, 291 (2016) (“Rather than 
presuming they are smarter or more knowledgeable than subordinated people, [rebellious 
lawyers] appreciate the intelligence, insights, and skills of all those with whom they work.”); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Rebellious Pedagogy and Practice, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 5, 13 (2016) (“López's 
vision focuses on enhancing the community-informed, collaborative problem-solving capacity 
of lawyers across a wide range of practice settings”). New generations continue to find 
inspiration in López’s work. See, e.g., Brenda Montes, A For-Profit Rebellious Immigration Practice 
in East Los Angeles, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 707, 707-09 (2017); Veryl Pow, Rebellious Social 
Movement Lawyering Against Traffic Court Debt, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1770, 1773 (2017). 
72 E.g., Francisco Valdes, Legal Reform and Social Justice: An Introduction to LatCrit Theory, Praxis 
and Community, 14 GRIFFITH L. REV. 148, 161-63 (2005). 
73 CRT, for example, took form in the 1980s and 1990s at a nadir in social movement activity 
in the United States, with a notable exception being the anti-AIDS activism of ACT-UP. See 
Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 1510-11 for a discussion of how CRT arose in a moment when 
“lawyers and legal scholars across the country realized that the impressive gains of the 1960s 
civil-rights era had halted and were, in many cases, being rolled back.” For an account of the 
important social movement organizing on AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s, see generally 
DAVID FRANCE, HOW TO SURVIVE A PLAGUE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW CITIZENS AND 
SCIENCE TAMED AIDS 355, 433-35 (2016). The mass movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
had been whittled down to formations at the edges of civil society (for example, MOVE in 
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moment of renewed vitality of social movements and particular crises, movement law 
can play an important role even in times of depressed social movement activity. As 
Cornel West noted in his 1990 essay, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, radical 
lawyers—including, we would argue, movement law scholars—can do important 
“defensive work . . . [to] keep alive memory traces left by past progressive movements 
of resistance—memory traces requisite for future movements.”74 
 
B. Movement Law Today 
 
We find ourselves now facing distinct crises and possibilities. Our current 
political moment underscores the misalignment between much contemporary legal 
scholarship, the decaying state of conventional democratic institutions, and the 
material reality of people’s lives.75 Though there are important exceptions, the legal 
academy has largely failed to meaningfully engage current social movement ideation. 
This can be partially explained by the hold of what Law and Political Economy (LPE) 
scholars have called “the Twentieth-Century synthesis”—the separation of the study 
of economic and political forms of law and lawmaking that has “muted problems of 
distribution and power throughout public and private law.”76 This moment calls on us 
to contest the dominant ideology and institutions that undergird our legal and political 
configurations. 
 
Philadelphia) or to bureaucratized and deradicalized non-governmental organizations vying 
for power as interest groups (for example, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights). 
There are multiple explanations for the defusing of social movement power, though the 
most direct is related to the work of the FBI through its COINTELPRO program to 
infiltrate and decapitate radical movement formations, such as the Black Panther Party. 
WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS 
FROM THE FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2001). 
The original CRT scholars both harkened back to the struggle for civil rights, particularly in 
their defense of rights against the Critical Legal Studies attack, and spoke with and for 
activists who continued to agitate against growing economic and social inequality, often 
through narrowing legal channels. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 
AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 5-6 (1991) (discussing the contemporary uses of 
j rights); Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last 
Reconstruction, supra note 55, at 1332 (describing immigrant anti-discrimination activism). But 
CRT scholars did not take root at a time of flourishing mass movements. They wrote in a 
time of racial retrenchment and in the first part of the neoliberal era of social and economic 
stratification fueled by color-blind ideologies. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, 
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331, 1336-37 (1988). David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy connect the civil rights and 
civil liberties advances of the time with a rare historical period of receding economic 
inequality between 1945 and 1973, later reversed by neoliberal attacks on the state. Inequality 
Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 61, 70 (2017).  
74 Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1799 (1990).  
75 For a powerful argument about the gutting of our formal democratic institutions, see 
Klarman, supra at note 12.  
76 Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 16, at 1791. 
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Movement law gives scholars permission to ground their work in movement 
organizing and ideation as an initial matter, rather than beginning with our siloed legal 
understandings. Movement law engages in what Aziz Rana has described as “a 
genuinely sympathetic hermeneutic,” in contrast to traditional scholarship that “often 
fails to make sense of the actual nature . . . of legal struggle and conflict.”77 Movement 
law begins with a commitment to grassroots contestation, and aims to emerge with 
new understandings of legal and economic structures and how they can shift as part 
of, rather than separate from, political struggle. 
 
Our scholarship must shift to meet this particular moment—in support of the 
rising social movements of our time. To be sure, many legal scholars tacitly write in 
support of movement efforts–for example, they may write sharp doctrinal pieces to 
be used in court by movement allies, or they may excavate histories of resistance that 
help illuminate the present. We ourselves have written scholarship in this vein.78 We 
celebrate this work even as we call for modes of scholarship that more explicitly align 
with left social movements. Movement law recognizes a role for legal scholarship 
alongside social movements, the power of an open dialectic between grounded 
understandings of liberatory possibilities and scholarly understandings of legal and 
political constellations.79 
 
We are not the only legal scholars calling for a shift in scholarly approaches in 
our current crises. Many of the scholars we discuss above continue to write in response 
to our crises today in alignment with today’s social movements.80 The LPE 
“Manifesto” demands that we dismantle artificial distinctions between law, politics, 
and economy.81 Bernard Harcourt argues that what is required is “a renewed embrace 
 
77 Email from Aziz Rana to authors (July 24, 2020) (on file with author). 
78 See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2015) (advancing an understanding of the First Amendment that 
sees the act of recording the police as itself protected speech). 
79 See Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 135, 146 (2007) (“It is the theory 
and philosophy of legal meaning making through popular mobilization that engages a ‘thick’ 
form of participation by people who are pushing for change by resisting manifestations of 
either public or private power.”); Cover, supra note 41, at 11 (“Although the state is not 
necessarily the creator of legal meaning, the creative process is collective or social.”). 
80 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 10, at 387-88 (describing the lessons of CRT for the Movement 
for Black Lives); KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, AFR. AM. POL’Y 
F., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY OF WOMEN, 2 (2015) 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560c068ee4b0af26f72
741df/1443628686535/AAPF_SMN_Brief_Full_singles-min.pdf; Matsuda, The Next Dada, 
supra note 57, at 1216-17.  
81 David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Law and Political Economy: 
Toward a Manifesto, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: LPE BLOG (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/law-and-political-economy-toward-a-manifesto/. 
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of praxis” alongside critique.82 We feel this urgency along with these and so many 
others in the legal academy and our broader communities.83  
By co-generating ideas with social movements seeking to transform the 
political, economic, and social status quo, movement law scholars adopt a counter-
cultural posture within the academy and profession. Movement law aims to disrupt 
the processes of social reproduction within law and legal education that naturalize the 
status quo and foreclose alternatives to elite rule.84 By thinking alongside movements 
that seek to delegitimize the status quo in service of transformation, we reject the status 
quo orientation of much of the legal scholarly project. Precisely because of law’s 
entanglement with hierarchal power relations, it is essential that we pay attention to 
the grassroots.  
 
Now is the time for more scholars to engage in movement law. John Whitlow 
underscores that our current political moment is particularly open to bottom-up calls 
for change: “in the midst of a societal pendulum swing, we become increasingly aware 
that historical time is open and contingent, rather than flattened and fixed: there is an 
alternative to the status quo, and it is acceptable, in fact necessary, to talk about it 
openly.”85 Scholars have a role to play in understanding the nature of the moment—
one of contingency and uncertainty—describing the stakes and co-constituting the 
terrain of the struggle. Through thick collaborations with social movements, scholars 
 
82 Bernard E. Harcourt, Introduction to 1/13: On Theory and Praxis, and Truth, Politics, and Power 
CRITIQUE & PRAXIS 13/13 (Sept. 8, 2018), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/praxis1313/bernard-e-harcourt-introduction-to-1-13-on-
theory-and-praxis-and-truth-politics-and-power/. For a full articulation of this form of 
critique and praxis, see BERNARD HARCOURT, CRITIQUE AND PRAXIS: A CRITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUSIONS, VALUES, AND ACTION (2020). See also Aziz Rana & Jedediah 
Britton-Purdy, We Need an Insurgent Mass Movement, DISSENT (2020), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/we-need-an-insurgent-mass-movement (calling us 
to look to mass movements as a way to understand our current situation). 
83 See, e.g., Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal 
History, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1044 (2011) (“‘Law as . . .’ dwells instead on the 
conditions of possibility for a critical knowledge of the here-and-now”). 
84 See Heidi Boghosian, The Amorality of Legal Andragogy, AGORA, https://perma.cc/LVZ2-
J2UG (“Legal andragogy is devoid of any critical analysis of the social policies that inhere in 
law or meaningful discussion of the role of lawyers in society.”); Duncan Kennedy, Legal 
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEG. ED. 591, 592, 600-02 (1982) (arguing that 
legal education trains students to reproduce social hierarchy). 
85 John Whitlow, Coming of Age at the End of History,  L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: LPE 
BLOG(Apr. 23, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/blog/coming-of-age-at-the-end-of-history/ (“This 
means acknowledging . . . [how] the market economy has ravaged society, and focusing our 
political energies on the formation of a countermovement for redistributive equality and social 
justice.”); see Rune Møller Stahl, Ruling the Interregnum: Politics and Ideology in Nonhegemonic Times, 
47 POL. & SOC’Y 333, 335, 349 (2019) (drawing from Antonio Gramsci to describe the post-
2008 crisis).  
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can help defend against the inevitable revanchism from political and economic elites 
in reaction to grassroots movements. 
 
It doesn’t escape us that movement law gives importance and agency to legal 
scholars in the midst of grassroots revolts led by activists and organizers, largely 
outside of the academy. We do not wish to exaggerate the importance of academics in 
political struggle. But we do believe that if we are going to generate scholarly work, we 
should do so responsibly, with attention to political dynamics and groups of people 
habitually ignored in the extant literatures. We should bring to bear our elite positions 
and the tools we’ve been privileged to acquire—whether they are social scientific 
methods, traditional legal analysis, or historical archives—to advance organizing and 
challenge entrenched social relations of hyper-inequality. Law review articles, as long 
as cumbersome as they may be, do powerful work. They can legitimize the existing 
architecture of the law and legal interpretation by confining arguments within existing 
understandings of the world,86 or they can help articulate a contrasting “nomos” that 
cannot be reconciled with our current arrangements, a different understanding of our 
ethical commitments to each other with which the academy and the law must then 
contend.87 As legal scholars, it is through thinking and acting in solidarity with social 
movements that we can most effectively move toward a more liberatory understanding 
of how we can relate to each other and to legal institutions and contribute to the 
building of a more just world. It is in this spirit that we work. 
 
Movement law is rooted in solidarity with those who have begun to transform 
their own political and legal consciousness through participation in grassroots social 
movement organizations across issue areas.88 These movement actors engage in a 
dialectic between praxis, critique, and ideation within various collective formations. In 
Antonio Gramsci’s terminology, they are organic intellectuals—people who 
understand and represent the collective realities of social groups, in particular within 
 
86 Cover, supra note 41, at 47 (“The community that writes law review articles has created a 
law—a law under which officialdom may maintain its interpretation merely by suffering the 
protest of the articles.”). 
87 Id. at 47-48 (describing how to protest the law is to create an alternate nomos that a judge 
must confront in their interpretation).  
88 Indeed, there are other scholars in ours and related disciplines that continue to think about 
engagement and participation as part of their methodology, for example through “engaged 
scholarship” and “participatory action research.” See, e.g, Emily M.S. Houh & Kristin Kalsem, 
It's Critical: Legal Participatory Action Research, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 287, 294 (2014) (“‘[L]egal 
participatory action research’ . . . makes its most significant and original contribution to legal 
scholarship . . . by treating those ‘at the bottom’ as equal research partners who are 
presumptively best situated to identify, analyze, and solve the problems that directly affect 
them.”); Setha M. Low & Sally Engle Merry, Engaged Anthropology: Diversity and Dilemmas, 51 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S203, S203 (2010) (describing “[t]he importance of developing 
an engaged anthropology that addresses public issues”). 
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the context of mass struggle.89 Barbara Ransby has pointed to the civil rights organizer 
Ella Baker as an organic intellectual who centered the agency of oppressed 
communities in understanding their conditions and waging their own struggles for 
change.90 This respect for on-the-ground thinking is blossoming in our current 
movement moment, opening up ways of thinking and acting collectively that have not 
been possible in the past.91  
 
Our openness to the alchemy of developing political and legal consciousness 
in struggle deepens our understanding of the stakes, the strategies, and the emerging 
imaginaries of today’s social movements.92 Our posture should not be to dismiss and 
re-legitimate, but to listen and consider, learn, participate, and cogenerate. By standing 
in solidarity, we contribute to the larger effort to keep the portal and the possibilities 
open. We participate in building alternatives rather than reifying the status quo. In the 
next Part, we outline the contours of movement law in the work of contemporary legal 
scholars, charting what we hope can be a roadmap for all scholars within the orbit of 
this project. 
 
II.  Toward Movement Law 
 
A small but growing number of law scholars are looking to organizing and 
social movements as sources of learning, inspiration, and ideation.93 In this Part, we 
theorize what it looks like for legal scholars to work in sustained ways alongside and 
 
89 See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 3-6 (Quintin Hoare 
& Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. & trans., 1971); see also Matsuda, supra note 52, at 325-26 
(describing her method of “looking to the bottom” as that of looking to Gramsci’s idea of 
“organic intellectuals”). 
90 BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT: A RADICAL 
DEMOCRATIC VISION 362 (2003) (“Baker’s political philosophy emphasized the importance 
of tapping oppressed communities for their own knowledge, strength, and leadership in 
constructing models for social change. She took seriously and tried to understand seriously 
the ways in which poor black people saw and analyzed the world.”). 
91 Barbara Ransby, The White Left Needs to Embrace Black Leadership, THE NATION (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/black-lives-white-left/ (“This is not like the 
1960s. White people marched in civil rights demonstrations, formed committees on interracial 
cooperation, and joined with the Black freedom movement, but the fire this time is hotter.”). 
92 Cf. BERNARD HARCOURT, CRITIQUE & PRAXIS 17 (2020) (“The solution to the problem of 
speaking for others is not to silence anyone, but the opposite: to collaborate and cultivate 
spaces where all can be heard, especially those who are most affected by our crises today.”). 
93 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres’s concept of demosprudence captures the idea that social 
movements and mobilized citizenry not only “change the fundamental normative 
understandings of our Constitution” but also “are critical . . . to the cultural shifts that make 
durable legal change possible.” Guinier & Torres, supra note 65, at 2743. Id. at 2750 
(“[D]emosprudence focuses on the ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can 
permanently alter the practice of democracy by changing the people who make the law and 
the landscape in which that law is made.”). 
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in conversation with social movements fighting for transformation. We use examples 
of scholars engaging in movement law to illustrate the four main moves of our 
methodology, but we do not mean to give an exhaustive list of people we consider to 
be movement law scholars.  
 
We surface movement law as a methodology or mode of legal scholarship. By 
so doing, we hope to integrate and engage more movement ideas and experiments in 
legal scholarship and our collective understanding of social change, social justice, and 
what is possible.94 Our aim, like that of Critical Race Theorists, is to uncover voices, 
experiences, and logics otherwise disappeared in legal scholarship because of the 
strong institutional commitment to traditional sources of authority and the status quo; 
to center questions of race and colonialism; and to stay grounded in the practices of 
contestation and survival by social movements and directly impacted people of all 
kinds. We hope to contribute to the growth and power of today’s social movements, 
and to their ideas, experiments, and campaigns.  
 
Movement law is made possible by methodological pathways and 
commitments that came before us.95 But its necessity is situated within twin aspects of 
our current moment: the increasingly clear failures of neoliberal law and politics, and 
the surge of social movement activity and grassroots organizing intent on transforming 
our social relations in fundamentally more just and liberatory ways. In a moment where 
the right and the left are rushing to fill a crisis of legitimacy of the status quo, and the 
status quo is increasingly failing, law scholars can play an important role. We seek to 
think and write in solidarity with movements because such work has the potential to 
shift actual power in the process, toward grassroots social movements, their ideas, 
strategies, and tactics. While social movements are not a perfect proxy for the demos 
at large—nothing is—they provide an important means by which to deepen 
democracy and expand collective self-governance. 
 
Movement law involves four interrelated moves. While these four moves are 
not always made, it is fair to think of each move as deepening the practice of the prior. 
First, movement law scholars pay close attention to modes of resistance by social 
movements and everyday people. Paying attention to social movements and everyday 
resistance is in itself significant, for it meaningfully diversifies the sources and horizons 
of legal scholarship. Second, movement law scholars work to understand the strategies, 
tactics, and experiments of resistance and contestation. By studying these strategies, 
tactics, and experiments—including but not limited to law reform campaigns—
scholars engage pathways and possibilities for justice often obscured within legal 
scholarship. Third, movement law scholars take seriously the epistemologies and 
 
94 Legal scholarship’s implicit acquiescence in “neoliberal’ political projects” has facilitated the 
many interlinked crises to which today’s movements are responding. Britton-Purdy et al., supra 
note 16, at, 1789, 1794-1818 (2020). We seek to unwind that acquiescence and allow for new 
sources and methods of social production. 
95 See supra Part I.A. 
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histories of the social movements they study. Fourth, movement law scholars move 
with a sense of solidarity and accountability to the social movements they study. They 
see themselves not as individual experts with opinions from above or apart from the 
movements they study, but as part of a collective process. 
 
A. Locating Resistance 
 
To start, movement law scholars pay attention to organizing, social 
movements, and collective resistance by everyday people. Movement law scholars are 
attuned to actually existing modes of resistance as a source for new insights about the 
nature and lived realities of law, as well as about what struggle for alternatives might 
look like. They start not from a discrete legal issue or doctrinal dispute, but from 
movements, their strategies and tactics. They recognize that social movements are 
engaging in deep ideation around questions of legal meaning and entitlement, 
citizenship and democracy.96 Social movements bring to the foreground critiques of 
the status quo in the margins of law and legal scholarship.97 Simultaneously, social 
movements advance radical reimaginations of law, legal institutions, and society more 
broadly.98 In the course of locating resistance, then, scholars expand the terrain of 
critique and imagination within legal scholarship and legal institutions.99 This 
expansion has profound potential to remake the project of law and legal scholarship: 
beyond elite technocracy, legitimation, law and order, or even radical critique, toward 
a transformative project of remaking ourselves and the world around us.100  
  
Locating resistance can begin by looking around one’s own local and virtual 
worlds. We are living in an era of intensified contestation of and rebellion against the 
 
96 Guinier & Torres, supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
97 Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
249, 252-55 (2019). 
98 Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination, supra note 4, at 412. 
99 For example, there are now multiple accounts of how undocumented youth changed the 
terrain for immigration law and policy, and directly challenged notions of citizenship, through 
their direct action and organizing. See Kathryn Abrams, Contentious Citizenship: Undocumented 
Activism in the Not1More Deportation Campaign, 26 BERK. LA RAZA L.J. 46, 47-50 (2016); Sameer 
M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1466-68 
(2017); Christine N. Cimini & Doug Smith, An Innovative Approach to Movement Lawyering: The 
Immigrant Rights Case Study 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). Marisol Orihuela has 
shown how positive emotions like love play a role in the forms of resistance employed by the 
sanctuary and Dreamer movements. Marisol Orihuela, Positive Emotions and Immigrant Rights: 
Love as Resistance, 14 STAN. J. C.R.-C.L. 19, 28-32 (2018).  
100 This study also has the power to transform our teaching. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar Law’s 
Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 366-73 (2015) 
[hereinafter Akbar, Law’s Exposure]. 
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status quo.101 Because of its utility in organizing campaigns, social media surfaces the 
work of social movements to a greater degree than ever before.102 Moreover, in an era 
of heightened social movement activity and a broader popular turn to the left, 
mainstream news outlets cover protests and resistance more frequently, and feature 
op-eds by movement intellectuals.103 As a result, local and national news, Twitter, 
Instagram, and Facebook—not to a mention a whole panoply of left media outlets—
are all popular primary and secondary source materials to identify left social movement 
campaigns, toolkits, experiments, and ideation of all manner.104  
 
We do not mean to suggest that movement law is limited to observation from 
above or afar. Indeed, many scholars are already part of social movements or come 
from communities that are sites of ongoing radical organizing. For those scholars, 
movement law facilitates a new kind of relationship to those struggles.105 As we explain 
through the proceeding moves, movement law scholarship can also draw from 
engagement with movement sources and ideas through text and observation, to 
attendance at local organizing meetings and events, to participation in campaigns, to 
engagement in participatory action research with movement leaders. Social media and 
 
101 E.g., Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Of Course There Are Protests. The State Is Failing Black People., 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/george-floyd-
minneapolis.html.  
102 Consider for example Mariame Kaba’s Twitter following of almost 150,000. Mariame Kaba 
(@prisonculture), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/prisonculture?lang=en. Or consider the 
number of social movement campaigns and organizations that have Instagram accounts. See, 
e.g., #FreeThemaAll4PublicHealth; JusticeLA (@justicelanow), INSTAGRAM, 
https://www.instagram.com/justicelanow/; see also Monica Anderson et al., 2. An Analysis of 
#BlackLivesMatter and other Twitter Hashtags Related to Political or Social Issues, PEW RESEARCH 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/07/11/an-analysis-of-
blacklivesmatter-and-other-twitter-hashtags-related-to-political-or-social-issues. 
103 Robin D. G. Kelley, What Kind of Society Values Property Over Black Lives, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/opinion/george-floyd-protests-looting.html; 
Kaba, supra note 27; Tolentino, supra note 25; Tolentino, supra note 28; Derecka Purnell, George 
Floyd Could Not Breathe. We Must Fight Police Violence Until Our Last Breath, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 27, 2020 2:12 PM EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/27/george-floyd-police-violence-
minnesota-racist.  
104 See generally MARIAME KABA & SHIRA HASSAN, FUMBLING TOWARDS REPAIR: A 
WORKBOOK FOR COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY FACILITATORS (AK Press 2019); ALEX 
VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (Verso 2017); Meagan Day, The Coming Pandemic-Induced 
Eviction Crisis, JACOBIN (June 30, 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/cares-act-
coronavirus-covid-stimulus-expiring-unemmployment; Defund Police Organizers Forum, THE 
DIG (June 20, 2020), https://www.thedigradio.com/podcast/defund-police-organizers-
forum; The Great May Day Rent Strike, COMMUNE (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://communemag.com/the-great-may-day-rent-strike. 
105 See generally Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous 
Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229 (1999-2000). 
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conventional media can be an entry point to finding local grassroots campaigns and 
organizations for deeper engagement. 
 
Scholars will undoubtedly develop distinct accounts of the types of resistance 
that merit study. For our part, we pay attention to the strategies, tactics, experiments, 
and narratives of left movements, organizations, and organizers, committed to 
political, economic, social transformation—not simple issue-specific reform or 
singular campaigns. We are interested in social movements, social movement 
organizations, unions and worker organizing, and other more fledgling formations of 
poor, working class people, and people of color that: (1) challenge law and politics as 
usual as they frame issues, deploy tools, tactics, and storytelling, and advance theories 
of change and transformative visions;106 and (2) turn to strikes, protests, and direct 
action, build alternative institutions like bail funds, cooperative land trusts and mutual 
aid networks, and run campaigns for deep and widespread transformation.107 These 
campaigns and experiments are rooted in a struggle for a radically reconstituted society. 
The strategies demonstrate commitments to an intersectional politics of anti-racism, 
anti-patriarchy, anti-capitalism, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, abolition, 
redistribution, gender justice, and economic democracy, even socialism.108 They are 
 
106 E.g., BYP100, LAW FOR BLACK LIVES, & THE CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, 
REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY: BUDGET TOOLKIT & RESOURCE GUIDE (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2020), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5500a55ae4b05a69b3350e23/t/597650396b8f5b857
dc48fa8/1500926014325/L4BL+-+Freedom+to+Thrive+Update.pdf; MOVEMENT FOR 
BLACK LIVES, REPARATIONS NOW TOOLKIT (2020) https://m4bl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Reparations-Now-Toolkit-FINAL.pdf; NATIONAL BAIL OUT, 
UNTIL FREEDOM COMES: A COMPREHENSIVE BAILOUT TOOLKIT (2017) 
https://www.nationalbailout.org/untilfreedomcomes. 
107 E.g., Juliana Kim, How the Floyd Protests Turned Into a 24-Hour ‘Occupy City Hall’ in N.Y., N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/nyregion/occupy-city-hall-
nyc.html; Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, https://brooklynbailfund.org/; CHI. CMTY. BOND 
FUND, https://chicagobond.org/; COOP. JACKSON, https://cooperationjackson.org/; Mutual 
Aid Resources, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/mutual-aid/; What is Mutual 
Aid?, BIG DOOR BRIGADE, https://bigdoorbrigade.com/what-is-mutual-aid/; PEOPLE’S 
BUDGET L.A., https://peoplesbudgetla.com/. For scholarship on some of these experiments, 
see, for example, James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts That Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
69, 69-74 (2009); Renee Hatcher & Jaime Lee, Building Community, Still Thirsty for Justice: 
Supporting Community Development Efforts in Baltimore, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. 
L. 27, 27-28 (2016); Renee Hatcher, Solidarity Economy Lawyering, 8 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & 
SOC. JUST. 23, 25-26 (2019); Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 282-91 (2016). 
108 E.g., MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, A VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: POLICY DEMANDS FOR 
BLACK POWER, FREEDOM, & JUSTICE (2016), https://neweconomy.net/resources/vision-
black-lives-policy-demands-black-power-freedom-and-justice; MIJENTE, FREE OUR FUTURE: 
AN IMMIGRATION POLICY PLATFORM FOR BEYOND THE TRUMP ERA (2018), 
https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Mijente-Immigration-Policy-
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rooted in study of past freedom struggles and the intellectual traditions and debates of 
those struggles.109  
 
We focus on such transformative movements for a number of reasons. These 
movements contend with the violence and inequality of the law.110 They represent 
experiences and histories often erased or flattened by doctrine and scholarship.111 They 
represent people locked out of meaningful representation in the formal channels of 
statecraft.112 They offer hopeful visions for a more equal world, a theory of change 
aligned with engaging and enfranchising the grassroots, and a meaningful set of 
experiments and demands to move us towards those visions.113 In short, identifying 
and examining these movements and what they do make legal scholarship better, more 
hopeful, more grounded, and more accountable to the world we want to build. 
 
We do not mean to suggest that social movements are perfect or divorced 
from the same limits of any other form of political action.114 Social movements are not 
always democratic or accountable to the grassroots.115 Organizations receive funding 
and support from the elite political and philanthropic strata in which the horizons of 
 
Platform_0628.pdf; RED NATION, THE RED DEAL: INDIGENOUS ACTION TO SAVE OUR 
EARTH, PART ONE: END THE OCCUPATION (2020), http://therednation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Red-Deal_Part-I_End-The-Occupation-1.pdf.  
109 E.g., Estes, supra note 14, at 169-99.  
110 For example, the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement brought attention to the routineness 
of lethal police and vigilante violence through its hashtag #Every28Hours in 2014. ARLENE 
EISEN, MALCOLM X GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT, OPERATION GHETTO STORM: 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE, 
SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES (2014), 
http://www.operationghettostorm.org/uploads/1/9/1/1/19110795/new_all_14_11_04.pdf
. See also Akbar, Law’s Exposure, supra note 100, at 354-55. 
111 For example, the Mijente Free Our Future report makes its demands in the context of the 
history of colonialism, western expansion, and anti-Mexican policy and sentiment. MIJENTE, 
supra note 108, at 9.  
112 For example, Black and Pink is an abolitionist organization rooted in working with queer 
and trans people who are incarcerated. BLACK & PINK, https://www.blackandpink.org/.  
113 For example, the Vision for Black Lives includes six major demands, with a whole range of 
local, state, and federal possibilities for action. MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, supra note 108. 
114 For a related argument that it is impossible to operate outside of the law, for example, see 
Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 940 (2007). 
115 See ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 224-35 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul 
trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1911) (describing an “iron law of oligarchy” in civil society 
organizations); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN A. TROW & JAMES S. COLEMAN, UNION 
DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 
8-9 (1956) (testing the oligarchy thesis in the context of labor unions in the mid-twentieth 
century). 
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political change are negotiated and limited.116 Factions are often jockeying for position 
and power in ways that are difficult to assess from the outside.117 Movement law should 
recognize this dynamism within social movements and between social movement 
organizations and other actors in civil society. Movement law also requires self-
reflexivity, recognizing that the act of locating resistance may itself elevate particular 
social movement actors over others. In Part III we address some of these concerns. 
But, now more than ever, the impact of organizing strategies and tactics on institutions 
of law and the shape of our imaginations could not be clearer. So, despite these limits, 
we believe it is imperative to engage. When we ignore social movement visions and 
organizing, we tacitly give weight to conventional policy approaches and actors, and 
ignore transformative possibilities.  
 
B. Thinking Alongside Strategies and Pathways for Justice 
 
Movement law requires studying how movements build and shift power—
beyond courts and the Constitution—and prefigure the economic, social, political 
relationships of the world they are working to build. As a result, movement law 
scholars study actually existing forms of social movement resistance: campaigns for 
legal and political change as well as prefigurative arrangements or experiments. The 
work shows a care and a concern for the unique contributions of social movements 
not simply in representing subordinated peoples, but as a locus for experiments, 
processes, and imaginations for transformational change.  
 
Studying existing forms of social movement resistance includes studying the 
demands and campaigns of social movement organizations. Kate Andrias, for 
example, looks to “Fight for $15” campaigns by low-wage workers fighting for higher 
wages and a union for all workers.118 Through a close study of these campaigns, 
Andrias demonstrates how contemporary workers’ movements are reconceiving 
relationships between workers, employers, and the state, and running campaigns in 
 
116 See Andrea Smith, Introduction, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE 
PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 1-18 (INCITE! ed., Duke Univ. Press 2017) (2007); Megan 
Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture, 53 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 275, 277-79 (2019); Susan Staggenborg, The Consequences of Professionalization and 
Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 585, 597 (1988); cf. Ashar, supra note 
106, at 1473, 1473 nn. 41-43. 
117 E.g., WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH 
MOVEMENT TRANSFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 82–83 (2013). 
118 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8, 46-47 (2016) (“[F]rom the social 
movements’ efforts one can derive a path toward a new labor law regime that is distinct from, 
even oppositional to, the legal regime that has governed since the New Deal.”). For an example 
focused on intellectual property, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and 
the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806-10 (2008).  
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service of that vision.119 The campaigns reject the private ordering of New Deal 
unionism and the employer-employee dyad as ushered in by the National Labor 
Relations Act.120 Instead, they imagine public “social bargaining” on a sectoral and 
regional basis with an active role for the state, and reject a sharp divide between 
employment and labor law, empowering more workers to engage in some form of 
social bargaining.121  
  
In taking movement strategies seriously, then, scholars learn from movement 
actors how to refuse categories in twentieth century law and social organizations—like 
the fixation on the employer-employee dyad—and can engage with grassroots ideation 
on alternative modes of legal and social organization—like social bargaining. Fight for 
$15 is a productive site for diversifying our understanding of strategies to reshape the 
terrain of labor law toward power for the working class and to win concrete changes 
for low-wage workers.122 The campaign points to pathways for changing the 
entitlements and power of low-wage workers that do not rely centrally on courts or 
litigation.  
 
Producing scholarship in conversation with such campaigns makes clear how 
grassroots contestation at the local level is central to the shape of law and legal 
entitlements. It brings attention to the limits of formal political and legal processes to 
represent the needs and preferences of working-class people, and the power of elites 
and corporations in defining the terrain.123 It demonstrates how movements enact 
change as they build grassroots power and imagine new possibilities, challenging the 
normative legal frameworks with which most scholarship is engaged and building new 
horizons for social change projects. 
 
119 A core way to imagine ways to move toward an “egalitarian distribution of power,” she 
argues, is to look “to historical and contemporary social movements that have opposed, and 
are opposing, hierarchies of power.” Kate Andrias, Response, Confronting Power in Public Law, 
130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 7 (2016). 
120 Andrias, supra note 118, at 58-63. 
121 Id. at 63-68. 
122 E.g., Peter Dreier, How the Fight for 15 Won, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://prospect.org/economy/fight-15-won/; Jeff Schuhrke, We’ve Been Fighting for $15 for 7 
Years. Today I’m Celebrating a Historic Victory., SALON (Feb. 23, 2019), 
https://www.salon.com/2019/02/23/weve-been-fighting-for-15-for-7-years-today-im-
celebrating-a-historic-victory_partner/. The campaign has been criticized for not being 
sufficiently grassroots, and for using top down “mobilizing” rather than “organizing,” 
including by labor organizer and intellectual Jane McAlevey. Michael Rozworski, Having the 
Hard Conversations: An Interview with Jane McAlevey, JACOBIN (Oct. 4, 2015), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/strike-chicago-teachers-union-public-private-
sector/; Micah Uetricht, Is Fight for 15 for Real?, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://inthesetimes.com/article/is-fight-for-15-for-real. McAlevey powerfully lays out the 
distinctions between advocacy, mobilizing, and organizing in NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING 
FOR POWER IN THE NEW GUILDED AGE 9-12 (2016). 
123 See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, 
and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 564-65 (2014). 
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Thinking with movements allows us to see that even legal rights can politicize, 
contest, and expand the power of working people. Paying attention to actual struggles 
opens up questions about how rights operate in particular contexts—whether and how 
they legitimate or shift relations of power—rather than what they are in the abstract. 
John Whitlow’s examination of the new right to counsel in eviction proceedings in 
New York City is illustrative.124 On the surface, the right to counsel in housing court 
should trigger the concerns articulated by CLS and CRT scholars about the limits of 
rights discourse to transform the prevailing order. But because Whitlow investigates 
the housing justice movement behind the establishment of the right, he is able to 
identify the right as part of a broader strategy “to increase the power of the tenant 
movement.”125 His deep study of the campaign allows him to appreciate how the right 
to counsel is functioning in more complex and transformative ways. He shows how 
organizers are deploying what could otherwise be a depoliticizing tactic as part of a 
larger movement “to intervene substantively in the affordable housing crisis and to 
contend with the private power of the real estate industry.”126  
 
The right to counsel is the beginning, rather than an end, to a strategy to take 
the courts away from landlords and a struggle to decommodify housing.127 In revisiting 
the critique of rights through a deep study of a social movement campaign, Whitlow 
contributes to our understanding of the dynamism of rights. For example, he describes 
how a right to counsel in eviction proceedings is meaningfully distinct from the right 
to counsel in criminal cases because it is a right against the landlord rather than the 
state itself. It is a rejoinder to private power in a system of property and contract that 
largely defers to private power. Moreover, the work of rights, like the work of any law, 
is not simply about what it does on paper, but what it does in practice, and how it 
operates over time in ongoing contests over the shape of the world. Understanding 
the organizing context of this struggle, past and current, is essential to efforts like this 
to situate seemingly traditional legal change within broader possibilities for 
transformation.128  
 
Studying actually existing forms of social movement resistance also helps 
unearth new possibilities for how to replace and restructure legal arrangements and 
institutions. Movement law scholars study the modes of organization and work that 
 
124 John Whitlow, Gentrification and Countermovement: The Right to Counsel and New York City’s 
Affordable Housing Crisis, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1081, 1082-87 (2019).  
125 Id. at 1082, 1128-32. 
126 Id. at 1123; see also SAM STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE 
STATE 12-13 (2019). 
127 Whitlow, supra note 124, at 1129-30. 
128 On law as practice, see generally Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman & Amna Akbar, Missing in 
Action: Practice, Paralegality, and the Nature of Immigration Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547 
(2017); Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman & Amna Akbar, Law, Police Violence, and Race: Grounding 
and Embodying the State of Exception, 23 THEORY & EVENT (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that 
racialized police violence is constitutive of law); see also McCann, supra note 46. 
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movement organizations take on to prefigure the worlds that they seek.129 This 
includes institutional prefiguration—for example, the creation of a workers center;130 
the development of mutual aid networks to provide food and medical equipment to 
protestors on the streets; or the design of dispute resolution practices within anarchist 
collectives.131 
 
Campaigns and prefigurative experiments are in a dialectical relationship—
articulating in different ways, through storytelling and relationship building, new 
modes of relating.132 Sameer Ashar and Catherine Fisk have written about worker 
centers as an innovation within low-wage worker organizing outside traditional 
unions.133 Worker centers experiment with different forms of worker representation 
on boards and campaign committees.134 Organizers are explicitly prefigurative as they 
emphasize democratic governance and autonomy within their organizations so as to 
prepare workers to assert political agency in their places of work, in defiance of 
increasingly autocratic modes of economic organization.135  
 
Ashar and Fisk show that organizers are keenly aware that the lives of 
workers—as women, people of color, differently abled, and queer and trans—are 
intersectional and that understanding their intersectional identities grounds organizing 
strategies for transformation.136 In the last two decades, for example, the National 
Domestic Workers Alliance has successfully pushed multiple states to adopt domestic 
 
129 Examples in past works include Guinier and Torres’s depiction of Fannie Lou Hamer and 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s integration of the Democratic Party, and Lucy 
White and Jeremy Perelman’s study of the collective prefiguration of social human rights in 
Africa. Guinier & Torres, supra note 65, at 2762-77; White & Perelman, supra note 70, at 3-5. 
130 Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking, supra note 19, at 428-30, 437 
131 Amy J. Cohen, On Being Anti-Imperial: Consensus Building, Anarchism, and ADR, 9 LAW, 
CULTURE & HUMANS. 243, 244-46 (2011). 
132 Relationships prefiguring in the transformational arrangements within social movements 
can then make their way into formal institutional arrangements. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, 
Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 328-33 (2018) (describing how 
social movements attempt to build power within the administrative state, through new 
institutional and policy-making arrangements); K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The 
Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 680-89 (2020) (describing social 
movement pushes for community control of local resources across areas of law and policy, 
including policing and economic development). 
133 Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms and Governance Experimentalism in 
Worker Centers, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2019, at 141, 168-76. 
134 Id. at 168-72. 
135 One organizer portrayed the mission of his worker center as filling the “need to figure out 
how to make people feel bigger” in relation to their employers. Id. at 163. See ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE 
DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) vii-xii (2017). 
136 Ashar & Fisk, supra note 133, at 167-68. 
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worker bills of rights.137 These victories speak to the power built by domestic worker 
organizing around the country. The focus on personal transformation in domestic 
worker organizing is a product of the identities of organizers and their close 
understanding of the standpoint of immigrant women in isolated work 
environments.138 To build power, workers need to be reached where they exist and to 
be engaged in organizational and campaign activities that are both personally and 
politically transformative. Young Black and brown organizers are called to address 
sources of trauma in the lives of their largely immigrant women worker base—of 
forced migration, of the abandonment of their children and families and their feelings 
of isolation in the U.S., of their vulnerability to bullying and abuse by their 
employers.139 Movement organizations are creatively devising means by which workers 
may make material gains through personal transformation and political engagement. 
They teach us that because the economic and the social are inextricably intertwined, 
we must begin to understand law and legal change in terms outside of and beyond 
conventional law reform campaigns. 
 
Grassroots campaigns for change exist across expert siloes and beyond the 
realm of worker and housing movements. Jocelyn Simonson, for example, has written 
about proliferating experiments in collective action against the carceral state: cop- and 
court-watching, participatory defense, community bail funds, and campaigns for 
people’s budgets and community control of the police.140 In studying grassroots 
contestation, Simonson moves the common points of reference within criminal law 
scholarship, from within the institutions of policing and prosecution to that of directly 
impacted communities. Bail funds, cop- and court-watching destabilize the normative 
footing of the carceral state: they redefine concepts of harm, community, and public 
 
137 Lauren Hilgers, Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/02/21/magazine/national-domestic-workers-
alliance.html. 
138 Id. at 168, 173. 
139 Id. at 172-174; see JENNIFER ITO, RACHEL ROSNER, VANESS CARTER, & MANUEL PASTOR 
USC DORNSIFE PROGRAM FOR ENV’T & REG’L EQUITY, TRANSFORMING LIVES, 
TRANSFORMING MOVEMENT BUILDING: LESSONS FROM THE NATIONAL DOMESTIC 
WORKERS ALLIANCE STRATEGY – ORGANIZING – LEADERSHIP (SOL) INITIATIVE 31-59 
(Nov. 2014). 
140 See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021); 
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 256 
(2019), [hereinafter Simonson, The Place of “the People”] (examining “bottom-up practices of 
marginalized groups intervening on behalf of defendants to show the possibility of a different 
way of thinking about the place of the people in the criminal process” where “members of the 
public are allowed to voice their support or opposition through procedural channels other 
than elections, juries, or community justice fora.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal 
Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1610-13 (2017) [hereinafter 
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice] (discussing communal contestatory tactics within the 
criminal legal system); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-trial World, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2231-32, 2183-85, (2014) [hereinafter Simonson, The Criminal Court 
Audience]; Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 392-98 (2016). 
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safety, as they directly contest the racialized logic of criminal law enforcement.141 
Institutional experimentalism borne of social movement activism challenges 
approaches to law that are individualized and embedded in carceral logics.  
 
For example, as Simonson shows, in posting bail for community members 
who cannot otherwise make bail, bail funds founded by social movement 
organizations problematize the system actors’ deployment of the terms “community” 
and “public safety.”142 “Community” is a kind of dog whistle—evoking an 
undifferentiated collective but speaking to whites, wealthy, and upper middle class 
people to whom the police tend to be accountable and for whom the basic structures 
and operations of the criminal legal system make sense, equate with justice.143 When 
bail funds post bail, they challenge notions of community and public safety by 
performing alternative visions of community and safety that include those targeted by 
the carceral state.144 At the same time, these projects provide modes of contestation 
and participation in a system that attempts to silence, shame, and exclude poor, Black, 
and brown communities from participating in self-governance. They create space for 
movements and communities to build bonds of solidarity and safety as they grow their 
power and their political analysis.145 
 
Thinking with social movements allows us to see how communities organize 
to survive increasingly perilous conditions and teaches us how legal process is central 
to the precarity of everyday life for so many poor and working-class people. Recently, 
Dean Spade has written on mutual aid networks, which have proliferated in the wake 
of COVID-19.146 The turn toward mutual aid is an essential alternative and 
 
141 For another example, Allegra McLeod recently examined an abolitionist view of justice 
emerging out of organizing in Chicago and contrasted it with legal concepts of justice. Allegra 
M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1637-49 (2019). 
142 Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 586-93 (2017) (describing how 
community bail funds contest larger ideas about the meaning of public safety and community). 
143 Cf. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 4-5 (2013); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, 
MERGE LEFT: FUSING RACE AND CLASS, WINNING ELECTIONS, AND SAVING AMERICA 16-
17 (2019).  
144 CHI. CMTY. BOND FUND, YEAR-END REPORT 2019 12 (2019), 
https://chicagobond.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ccbf_year_end_2019-final.pdf.  
145E.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Bail Fund Moment: Reclaim the Neighborhood, Reclaim Community, 
Reclaim Public Safety, N+1 (June 22, 2020) (describing the relationship between the long-term 
organizing of bail funds and the surge of bail fund donations and activities during the uprisings 
of 2020) https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/the-bail-fund-moment/. 
146 Dean Spade, Solidarity Not Charity: Mutual Aid for Mobilization and Survival, 142 SOC. TEXT, 
Mar. 2020, at 131 [hereinafter Spade, Solidarity Not Charity]; DEAN SPADE, MUTUAL AID: 
BUILDING SOLIDARITY DURING THIS CRISIS (AND THE NEXT) (2020). For two decades, 
Dean Spade has been writing with social movement organizations against the grain of legal 
scholarship and offering insights from social movement strategies. See generally Dean Spade, 
Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform, 38 SIGNS 1031, 1046-47 (2013); DEAN SPADE, NORMAL 
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complement to law reform strategies, Spade argues, in part because of how law reform 
often fails to offer material relief to the most vulnerable people.147 Mutual aid is an 
essential mode of “building new social relations that are more survivable.”148 Spade 
speaks to mutual aid as an abolitionist strategy rooted in practices of collective care 
and self-determination.149 Mutual aid strategies, like the Black Panther Party’s survival 
programs, illustrate the failures of the state to provide for the basic needs of everyday 
people.150 Through mutual aid, he explains, people do more than facilitate collective 
survival, they learn how to work together, collaborate, learn from each other. For 
example, by “help[ing] one another through housing court proceedings [participants] 
will learn the details of how the system does its harm and how to fight it, but they will 
also learn about meeting facilitation, working across difference, retaining volunteers, 
addressing conflict, giving and receiving feedback, following through, and 
coordinating schedules and transportation.”151 They learn how to make change 
together. 
 
Whether it is Fight for $15 or bail funds, mutual aid projects or workers 
centers, these prefigurative social change projects directly challenge prevailing legal 
and institutional arrangements and the ideas that hold them in place.152 They point to 
the problems with status quo political, economic, and social arrangements. They create 
new pathways for justice and fight for horizons otherwise invisible within legal 
scholarship. They point to the broad array of strategies and tactics central to justice 
projects focused on transformation. Scholars miss much when they ignore social 
movement experimentation and prefiguration.  
 
C. Shifting the Episteme 
 
Movement law shifts the focal point of legal studies by taking seriously the 
epistemes and histories of social movements—their worldviews, source material, and 
intellectual traditions. This is especially important given the centrality of law in the 
history of exclusion and domination in the United States, and in today’s attempt to 
maintain the legitimacy of the status quo. Movement law unearths an alternative arc 
 
LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
(Duke Univ. Press 2015) (2009). 
147 Spade, Solidarity Not Charity, supra note 146, at 131-33 (discussing how mutual aid “is an 
often devalued iteration of radical collective care that provides a transformative alternative to 
the demobilizing frameworks” of law reform). 
148 Id. at 136, 147.  
149 Id. at 131, 138; see also Angela P. Harris, Compassion and Critique, 1 COL. J. RACE & L. 326, 
351 (2012) (connecting how the capacity to care is central to advancing critical race theory and 
coalescing movements). 
150 Spade, Solidarity Not Charity, supra note 146, at 136.  
151 Id. at 137-38.  
152 For another example, see Cházaro, supra note 99, at 67-74 (examining Chicago’s Erase the 
Database campaign—a “collaboration between immigrant-led and Black-led grassroots 
organizations”—that has worked to eliminate the Chicago gang database). 
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of history, of people collectively generating ideas and struggling to build and practice 
alternative possibilities: from the bottom up, often at great risk to their own safety, 
rather than top down. How can we create structures of living that allow us to thrive 
together on shared land and with multiple forms of life? How have people lived and 
struggled in these ways in the past? What past struggles over land, resources, and labor 
shape our current norms and laws? These questions are deeper than what 
constitutional discourse and traditional adjudicatory forums allow. And when put next 
to conventional legal structures they allow for new, often revelatory, ways of thinking 
about law, the state, and justice.153  
 
Social movements draw on lines of thought and material struggles across time 
to arrive at their collective analyses of the present. The Movement for Black Lives 
situates its critiques and paths forward in Black struggles and Black intellectual 
traditions.154 The Red Nation grounds itself in centuries of Native resistance.155 
Grounded in not just their own histories, but also the histories of other movements, 
contemporary movement actors build broader solidarities. When Mijente discusses its 
movement’s “DNA,” for example, there is an insistence: “We see our liberation as 
bound to Black Liberation, Indigenous sovereignty, economic and climate justice and 
other liberation movements.”156 These are histories of intellectual thought born in 
struggle, always dynamic, but full of wisdom for our times. Contingency—to be rooted 
in the present crises—is an aspect of grounded and historical analysis from which we 
learn. 
 
Movement scholars point to the contingency of social-political-economic 
relations, not simply as a way to throw the status quo into question, but to point to 
the status quo itself as a product of ongoing struggle. They do this by turning to the 
history of people’s movements. Aziz Rana, for example, critiques the rise of 
constitutional veneration as a way overshadow our colonial slave-holding past and 
deep social movement contestation.157 To recover alternate histories and possibilities, 
 
153 These questions echo those long asked in Black feminist scholarship. See generally Patricia 
Hill Collins, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE 
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 266, 270-71 (2000) (describing how black feminist 
epistemology can destabilize established understandings of the world). 
154 Akbar, supra note 4, at 408. 
155 THE RED NATION, supra note 6. 
156 Our Principles of Unity, MIJENTE, https://mijente.net/our-dna/. 
157 See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Rise of the Constitution (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); AZIZ 
RANA, supra note 12, at 5-7 ; Aziz Rana, Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 263, 269 (2015) [hereinafter Rana, Colonialism] (“[P]art of the discursive power of civic 
national identity continues to come from its disavowal of any need for . . . structural 
transformation, precisely since it reads a liberal and egalitarian identity into the country’s very 
genesis.”). For other work denaturalizing our current understanding of Constitutional 
arrangements, and historicizing shifting understandings, through time and political 
contestation, see Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. 
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Rana tells the story of the Black Panther Party’s (BPP) own 1970 constitutional 
convention, attended by at least 12,000 people, including members of the American 
Indian Movement, the Young Lords, Students for a Democratic Society and more.158 
For the BPP, the convention was a rejection of the U.S. Constitution and how it 
naturalized the “economic and political subordination” of Black people within the 
United States at the same time that it severed the Black freedom struggle from 
anticolonial struggles around the world.159 During breakout sessions at the convention, 
participants generated “a new alternative text framed around a variety of basic 
demands” that drew from global decolonization efforts.160 The resulting proposals 
included reparations, the transfer of wealth, truth commissions, and expanded 
socioeconomic rights.161 The convention marked the United States as a colonial project 
and conjured the possibility of a radical and reconstituted alternative, even if the 
ratification of the document was stymied by internal discord.162 Rana’s work, then, 
reminds us of the contingency of our legal order. In his charting of the rise of 
constitutional veneration, he denaturalizes our almost religious preoccupation with the 
Constitution as central to American political identity. In documenting the BPP’s 
convention, he centers long histories of contestation, in particular within the Black 
freedom struggle. 
 
Movement law scholars take cues from social movement epistemes as a way 
to denaturalize the status quo, refuse the abstraction of the violence of everyday law, 
make clear the contingency of our political, economic, and social relationships, and 
gesture at new possibilities.163 Movement law scholars take seriously the horizons of 
social movement imaginations—even if they reject outright the Constitution or 
 
L. REV. 669, 672 (2014) (looking to political movements of the gilded age to generate ideas 
about how political economy is a constitutional problem); LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF 
FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE 1-13 (2016) (telling the history of 
the right to free speech as rooted in labor struggles to strike and organize, before it shifted to 
being understood as an individual right to be effectuated in court); Amy Kapczynski, 
Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1041-47 (2005) 
(exploring constitutional historiography, that is, “how theorists, lawyers, and judges elaborate 
the past in constitutional context.”)] 
158 Rana, Colonialism, supra note 157, at 285. 
159 Id. at 282-85. 
160 Id. at 285. 
161 Id. at 285-86. 
162 The ratification of their Constitution was stymied by internal discord within BPP leadership, 
and the second ratifying convention was never held. Id. at 286. 
163 See DAVINA COOPER, EVERYDAY UTOPIAS: THE CONCEPTUAL LIFE OF PROMISING 
SPACES 32 (2014) (“Epistemologies of the margins are not simply intended as perspectives 
from which to critique mainstream, hegemonic forms; they also open up possibilities for 
exploring what other kinds of forms could be like.”). 
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prevailing legal norms and arrangements—to make new demands.164 In so doing they 
point to new possibilities that legal scholarship might otherwise ignore.  
 
Amna Akbar’s work, for example, centers around the contemporary 
imaginaries of the Movement for Black Lives and abolitionist organizing.165 Akbar 
mines a rich lineage of Black radical thought at the juncture of race and capitalism to 
contextualize movement demands. She puts this intellectual history in dialogue with 
contemporary criminal law scholarship to question liberal legalism and our traditional 
approaches to reform.166 Like Rana’s turn to the BPP, Akbar features left intellectuals 
and organizers not commonly featured in legal academic work, such as those of 
abolitionist intellectual-organizers Rachel Herzing and Mariame Kaba.167 At the same 
time, Akbar requires us to take seriously the long historical arc invoked by today’s left 
movements in understanding the United States today. For example, abolitionist 
organizers invoke the history of enslavement, slave patrols, and border patrols to 
understand contemporary policing—redefining policing as central to racialized 
violence past and present.168 Akbar shows us how our thinking expands when we 
encounter this long history of struggle. Taken together, after reading Akbar’s work we 
emerge with not just deeper critique, but larger possibilities—a “radical imagination,” 
an “abolitionist horizon”—through which movements seek to de- and reconstruct law 
and the state.169 
 
Movement law inquiries that shift epistemes can range from close, critical 
analysis of movement texts, to immersion in social movement spaces, to even co-
authoring or engaging in participatory action research with movement leaders. Janet 
Moore, for example, has co-authored with movement leaders in her work examining 
the power of the practice of participatory defense,170 and now engages in participatory 
 
164 In a recent work, Matsuda thinks with left intellectuals and social movements to imagine a 
utopian constitution as a basis for imagining the right to art. Matsuda, The Next Dada , supra 
note 57, at 1211, 1217-30 (arguing that “Frederick Douglass believed that the preamble was 
ground enough to demand the end of slavery” and so “it is ground enough to say there is a 
right to art.”).  
165 See Amna Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 103-07 
[hereinafter Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon] (forthcoming 2020); Akbar, Law’s Exposure, supra note 
100 at 353, 366-73 Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination, supra note 4, at 406-10. 
166 Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 165, at 105; Akbar, Law’s Exposure, supra note 100, at 
352, 355; Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination, supra note 4, at 407-09. See also Sean Flores, “You 
Write in Cursive, I Write in Graffiti”: How #BlackLivesMatter Reorients Social Movement Legal Theory, 
67 UCLA L. Rev. 1022 (2020).  
167 Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 165, at 149, 162; Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination, 
supra note 4, at 436, 460-61, 466, 468. 
168 Amna Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 165, at 102. 
169 Id. at 101; Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination, supra note 4, at 412. 
170 See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and 
the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (2015) (describing the 
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action research alongside movement activists who are working to redefine public 
safety in their community.171 With participatory action research, legal scholars can use 
tools of social science to treat movement actors and activists as equal research partners 
in the generation of questions and answers about the world—for example, the 
question “what is public safety?”.172  
 
Whatever form the scholarship takes, whether participatory action research or 
a different form of grounded inquiry, movement law points to the contingency of the 
stories we tell about the histories of the United States—of oppression and resistance—
as well as the contingency of our contemporary arrangements.173 It points to the 
limitations of telling grounded stories about the workings of the law that rely primarily 
on traditional legal sources, and do not pay heed to people’s experiences or 
movements’ stories. Even grounded stories told through conventional frames may 
reify the status quo; movement intermediation and interpretation is essential. It reveals 
the limits of liberal legalism and its histories of linear progress. And yet, it gives us 
hope for future possibilities and openings, too. 
 
 
participatory defense movement and its power, co-authored with movement leaders who 
pioneered the practice of participatory defense). 
171 See Lauren Johnson, Cinnamon Pello, Ebony Ruhland, Simone Bess, Jacinda K. Dariotis, 
& Janet Moore, Reclaiming Safety at 3, 8-9 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors)(describing participatory action research in which community members in Cincinnati 
are collectively redefining public safety alongside academic researchers, using a method that 
“prioritizes prioritizes shifting research capacities from academic researchers to the 
communities themselves by focusing on their needs, strategies, and expertise.”. 
172 Johnson and her co-authors have found that some participants in their study—community 
members in Cincinnati—rejected dominant punitive frameworks of safety as connected to 
policing, and instead voiced demands for education, housing, and healthcare. Id. at 3, 17-18, 
22-23, 25. Other legal scholars have written about participatory action research. See Houh & 
Kalsem, supra note 88, at 294 (“‘[L]egal participatory action research’ . . . makes its most 
significant and original contribution to legal scholarship not only by ‘looking to the bottom’ 
in a theoretical sense, but also by treating those ‘at the bottom’ as equal research partners who 
are presumptively best situated to identify, analyze, and solve the problems that directly affect 
them.”); Editha Rosario-Moore & Alexios Rosario-Moore, From the Ground Up: Criminal Law 
Education for Communities Most Affected by Mass Incarceration, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 753, 754-55 
(2017) (“In concert with Critical Legal Theory, [participatory action research] challenges both 
the objective neutrality of the law and claims of empirical objectivity made by social 
researchers.”). 
173 See, e.g., Rana, supra note 12, at 336 (arguing that imagining big change first requires “linking 
the concrete material interests of specific groups to the larger common good and thus showing 
how experiences of inequality or subordination illuminate a more pervasive social 
predicament.”).  
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D. Adopting a Solidaristic Stance 
Movement law asks scholars to engage in the scholarly project in solidarity and 
in conversation with social movements.174 This solidaristic stance requires 
commitment to experimentation, transformation, and collectivity. It displaces the legal 
scholar as an individual expert with just the right technocratic fix, taking a stance both 
more humble and more bold. Movement law does not require a particular kind of 
relationship (for example, as a legal advocate or advisor), but does require writing in 
conversation rather than from above in critique: participating in a collective process 
for generating and testing ideas and strategies for transformative change.  
Solidarity is essential because meaningful ideas for transformative change 
develop and gain traction through collective struggle and political praxis.175 Veena 
Dubal is a powerful example of how a solidaristic stance can transform scholarship. 
As a legal scholar and anthropologist who started her legal career as an Asian Law 
Caucus staff attorney, Dubal has complicated accounts of the “gig economy” and 
liberal legalist approaches to reform. She uses scholarly method—ethnographic 
interviews with drivers and organizers in the gig economy—to engage worker 
organizing in a time of deep economic precarity for workers and consolidated political 
power of employers in the industry. Dubal has studied how state and local regulators 
have been coopted by the platform companies, showing how the companies initially 
disrupted regulatory regimes by disregarding them and then consolidated their power 
by mobilizing dispersed consumers and drivers to alter those regimes in their favor.176 
Dubal has argued that employers maintain an overwhelming advantage over workers 
through corporate restructuring and their refusal to bargain collectively.177  
Dubal’s scholarly work deepens her advocacy. But perhaps more interestingly, 
her engagement with worker organizing through social movement groups has defined 
her scholarly trajectory. Dubal’s nuanced understanding of worker identities has 
informed her involvement with groups like Rideshare Drivers United on legislation 
 
174 See COOPER, supra note 163, at 20 (exploring “the oscillating movement between imagining 
and actualization”).  
175 For another example of a legal scholar whose work has been impacted by engagement with 
social movements, consider Justin Hansford. See, e.g., Justin Hansford, The First Amendment 
Freedom of Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 YALE L.J.F. 685, 685-91 (2018); Justin Hansford & 
Meena Jagannath, Ferguson to Geneva: Using the Human Rights Framework to Push Forward a Vision 
for Racial Justice in the United States After Ferguson, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 121, 123 
(2015); Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial: Ethics for Movement Lawyers, in Ferguson and 
Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057, 2057-60 (2017).  
176 See V.B. Dubal, Ruth Berins Collier & Christopher Carter, Disrupting Regulation, Regulating 
Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 2-4) (on file with authors).  
177 V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation 
on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 747, 794, 800 fig. 1. 
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codifying employee status for drivers.178 She intervened directly in Uber and Lyft’s 
class action litigation against worker organizing by objecting to a class-action 
settlement on behalf of a group of plaintiffs from a fledgling worker organization 
called the San Francisco Bay Area Driver Association.179 Dubal was recently targeted 
by Uber and Lyft as a consequence of her scholarship and advocacy,180 as the 
companies spent $200 million to overturn the state legislative effort in which she was 
involved.181 She has picked sides, with fledgling organizing formations and against the 
ongoing efforts by established unions to collaborate with the platform companies to 
create a new legal status for workers devoid of statutory employee protections.182 By 
targeting Dubal, the platform companies have effectively forced her to own her 
political work as a significant component of her identity as a scholar and teacher and 
she has not backed down.  
Angélica Cházaro’s work also embodies a strong dialectic between scholarship 
and solidarity.183 At the outset of her academic career, in 2014, Cházaro served as a 
“chief negotiator” on behalf of immigrants during an almost two-month hunger strike 
at the Northwest Detention Center (NWDC) in Tacoma.184 The hunger strike emerged 
in response to a one-day shut down of NWDC by the nascent #Not1More 
 
178 Veena Dubal, Rule Making as Structural Violence: From a Taxi to Uber Economy in San Francisco,  
L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: LPE BLOG(June 28, 2018) https://lpeproject.org/blog/rule-
making-as-structural-violence-from-a-taxi-to-uber-economy-in-san-francisco/; V.B. Dubal, 
An Uber Ambivalence: Employee Status, Worker Perspectives, & Regulation in the Gig Economy, 4-6 
(U.C. Hastings L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Rsch. Paper No. 381, 2019). For a discussion 
of how many workers see themselves as independent contractors rather than “wage slaves,” 
see V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 65, 120 (2017). 
179 Declaration of Veena Dubal in Support of Objections to Class Action Settlement Filed by 
Adham Shaheen, Gladys Quinones, Mahmood Noori, and Edward Escobar, Mohammad 
Zadran, at 2, 7 O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 904 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 13-
3826-EMC & 15-00262-EMC). 
180 Dara Kerr, ‘A totally different ballgame’: Inside Uber and Lyft’s fight over gig worker status, 
CNET.com (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/features/uber-lyfts-fight-over-gig-
worker-status-as-campaign-against-labor-activists-mounts/. 
181 Wilfred Chan, Can American Labor Survive Prop 22?, The Nation (Nov. 10, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/prop-22-labor/ (Quoting Veena Dubal as 
saying, “It needs to be about ownership, redistribution, collective power. We’re not at a 
place anymore where enough people are getting by, that things are OK. If people feel this 
anger collectively, they can build something transformative.”). 
182 Id. 
183 Cházaro started her legal career at the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP). 
UNIV. WASH. SCH. L., Angélica Cházaro, https://www.law.uw.edu/directory/faculty/chazaro-
angelica. 
184Id.; Liz Jones, Protestors Try to Block Deportations from Northwest Detention Center, KUOW (Feb. 
25, 2014, 8:45 AM), https://www.kuow.org/stories/protestors-try-block-deportations-
northwest-detention-center/.  
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formation—an early abolitionist turn among immigrant organizing.185 Later, Cházaro 
helped to start La Resistencia, a grassroots effort to shut down NWDC, which 
eventually became a hub organization in Mijente and an organization in the 
Decriminalize Seattle coalition focused on defunding the Seattle Police Department.186 
As she engaged in organizing and produced scholarship, Cházaro co-authored 
Mijente’s abolitionist policy platform Free Our Future.187 In scholarly work on 
deportation abolition, Cházaro builds out critiques of deportation and detention 
embedded within Free Our Future.188 Cházaro reframes the scholarly question of how 
to “comport” deportation “with the rule of law” to whether deportation is justifiable 
as a broader matter of politics and ethics.189 She situates deportation in a historical 
context, denaturalizing its existence and questioning its ongoing function.190 In this 
way, she suggests the fait accompli embedded within the mode of analysis that takes 
 
185 Tania Unzueta, Maru Mora Villalpando & Angélica Cházaro, We Fell in Love in a Hopeless 
Place: A Grassroots History from #Not1More to Abolish ICE, MEDIUM (June 29, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@LaTania/we-fell-in-love-in-a-hopeless-place-a-grassroots-history-
from-not1more-to-abolish-ice-23089cf21711; NWDC Resistance, A Hunger Strikers 
Handbook 13-16 (Apr. 2017), available at https://www.nwdcresistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/HungerStrikersHandbook-ENG.pdf.  
186 LA RESISTENCIA, http://laresistencianw.org/; Daniel Beekman, Seattle City Council Pressed 
to Defund Police, Move 911 Response Dispatchers Out of Department, SEATTLE TIMES (July 8, 2020 
7:33 PM) (updated Aug. 12, 2020 11:35 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/seattle-city-council-pressed-to-defund-police-move-911-response-dispatchers-
out-of-department/; Seattle Urged to See a ‘World Without Law Enforcement,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/7ff3a5143ae9306ced7613c9824e05d0. 
187 Press Release, Leading Latinx Racial Justice Organization Releases “Free Our Future” 
Policy Platform in Wake of War Waged Against Immigrants, Mijente (June 28, 2018), 
https://mijente.net/2018/06/leading-latinx-racial-justice-organization-releases-free-our-
future-policy-platform-in-wake-of-war-waged-against-immigrants-policy-calls-for-full-scale-
decriminalization-of-immigrat/; Marielena Castellanos, Demonstrators Call for ICE to be Abolished 
and Protest Operation Streamline, PORTSIDE (July 4, 2018) https://portside.org/2018-07-
04/demonstrators-call-ice-be-abolished-and-protest-operation-streamline; Coalition Demands 
Moratorium on Construction of Youth Jail, PUBL. NEWS SERV. (Mar. 20, 2018) 
https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2018-03-20/juvenile-justice/coalition-demands-
moratorium-on-construction-of-youth-jail/a61880-1.  
188 Cházaro, supra note 99, at 6-7 (“The [Free Our Future] platform brings together diverse 
sites of implementation of the deportation machinery, while reorienting allegiance away from 
an unquestioning attachment to the abstraction of the rule of law and towards the populations 
such abstraction preserves as deportable.”).  
189 Id. at 23-24, 27-28, 37 (citing Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Micol Siegel, and 
Chandan Reddy).   
190 Id. at 36 (“[F]or much of US immigration history . . . noncitizens were arrested and were 
not deported. As recently as 1984, only 1,000 people were deported on criminal grounds, as 
compared to 138,669 ‘criminal aliens’ deported in 2016.”). 
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for granted a historically contingent form of enforcement, and gestures at the deeper 
questions that social movement actors are posing.191  
 
Scholars adopt a solidaristic stance in various ways. Dorothy Roberts and 
Daniel Farbman have each written about the histories of abolitionist struggles against 
enslavement: in tone and content, these articles are offerings, in conversation with 
lawyers and organizers in movement, rather than criticisms from on high.192 Monica 
Bell has written “in conversation with movements for racial and economic justice” 
about entitlements to “[s]afety, friendship, and dreams” for Black people as central to 
the unfinished work of the Civil Rights Movement.193 Kimberlé Crenshaw has 
authored a number of reports in conversation with the Movement for Black Lives and 
street mobilizations against police killings of Black people. Most significantly, in 2015, 
through the African American Policy Forum, she coauthored with Andrea Ritchie the 
#SayHerName report, which draws attention to Black women’s experiences of police 
violence.194 
 
191 She draws on indigenous intellectuals and the history of settler colonialism to reveal the 
contingency of states and borders more broadly. Id. at 49-54. Cházaro also draws on the work 
of E. Tendayi Achiume, who theorizes migration as a mode of decolonization in ways that 
disrupt conventional ways of thinking about migration, borders, and immigration law. Id. at 
51-54, 58; see also E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1519-
20 (2019). 
192 See, e.g., Farbman, supra note 11, at 1953 (using the history of abolitionist lawyers to argue 
that, in the present, “a clear political analysis and a deep connection with movement activists 
can transform a triage legal practice into a tool in a broader project of social change”); Dorothy 
E. Roberts, The Supreme Court 2018 Term—Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 6-10 (2019) (discussing the long arc of the abolitionist movements from slavery to 
prisons); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Atwater and the Misdemeanor Carceral State, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 147, 176-77 (2020) (exploring how movement-based anticarceral commitments can 
intersect with contemporary approaches to low-level criminal offenses). 
193 Monica C. Bell, Safety, Friendship, and Dreams, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 703, 707-08 
(2019). 
194 Crenshaw & Ritchie, supra note 80, at 1; see also #SayHerName: Resisting Police Brutality Against 
Black Women, African American Policy Forum, AFR. AM. POL’Y F., 
http://aapf.org/sayhernamereport/; #SayHerName, African American Policy Forum, (n.d.) 
https://aapf.org/shn-campaign (describing the #SayHerName campaign); Shatema 
Threadcraft, North American Necropolitics and Gender: On #BlackLivesMatter and Black Femicide , 
116 S. ATL. Q. 553, 566, 568-69 (2017). In the same year, Crenshaw co-authored with Priscilla 
Ocen and Jyoti Nanda a report on the experiences of girls of color with the “school-to-prison 
pipeline.” KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, PRISCILLA OCEN & JYOTI NANDA, AFR. AM. 
POL’Y F., BLACK GIRLS MATTER: PUSHED OUT, OVERPOLICED, AND UNDERPROTECTED, 
at 5 (2015), 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/legacy/files/public_affairs/2015/februar
y_2015/black_girls_matter_report_2.4.15.pdf. Crenshaw and others have argued that 
intersectionality strengthens solidaristic practices. See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private 
Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control , 59 
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Solidarity generates new understandings.195 We, too, have each learned 
profound lessons about law, violence, justice, and social change from collaborations 
with social movement organizers and organizations.196 We have shifted our habits of 
study, lawyering, teaching, and writing as a result. Our collaborations with social 
movements live on the page as well as in how we spend our time: lawyering for 
immigrant workers or caged human beings, providing legal support for protests, co-
authoring reports or toolkits for movement spaces, or participating in meeting after 
meeting for campaigns or bail funds. And we do much of this work with our students, 
both inside and outside of the classroom. 
 
Movement law scholars share commitments to experimentation; collectivity; 
political, economic, and social transformation; and building mass social movements of 
ordinary people. This solidarity is born of a recognition and understanding of law as a 
 
UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1450 (2012) (“Thinking more critically about the intersectional failures 
of feminism and antiracism reveals how the political marginality of women of color might be 
understood as a condition that weakened the capacity of both movements to recognize and 
resist the ideological foundations upon which these dynamics are grounded.”); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 
1500 (2012) (“[T]his analysis suggests the need for cross-movement strategies that can address 
multiple forms of systemic injustice to contest the overpolicing of women of color and expose 
how it props up an unjust social order”); Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of Color & 
Delinquency in the Juvenile Justice System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1521 (2012) (“An intersectional 
analysis allows us to see how the marginalization experienced by girls of color is different from 
that experienced by girls generally and boys of color.”); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially 
Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 1540, 1559-64 (2012) (“When we examine the surveillance and exclusion that occurs 
in the context of subsidized housing, we can see the ways in which the constructs of Black 
women are doing significant work in the maintenance of racial stratification and the 
criminalization of Black populations.”). 
195 Luke Herrine gives a compelling example of this when he describes lawyering alongside 
the Debt Collective, through which the “shared condition of indebtedness” became “a 
source of solidarity that could strike at the very heart of both the current structure of 
governance and the dominant form of profit accumulation.” Luke Herrine, Debtor Organizing 
Against Neoliberalism, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: LPE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://lpeblog.org/2019/04/26/debtor-organizing-against-neoliberalism/; see also Luke 
Herrine, The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 281 (2020).   
196 We have also learned the importance of collaborative projects within the academy, and how 
they open up new ways to study and teach. The three of us came together in 2016 to think 
together about how to teach differently. We worked with Bill Quigley and a cohort of law 
faculty who strive to teach our classes in a way that responded to the period of protest and 
organizing that was sparked by Darren Wilson’s killing of Michael Brown. We issued a series 
of Guerrilla Guides to Law Teaching on a number of core law school classes. GUERRILLA 
GUIDES TO L. TEACHING, https://guerrillaguides.wordpress.com/. We started with four 
principles that began to articulate what we are now theorizing here. No. 1: Four Principles, 
GUERRILLA GUIDES TO LAW TEACHING (2016), 
https://guerrillaguides.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/fourprinciples/. 
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discourse of power and legitimation, as well as a tool to build power from the left and 
for the many. Solidarity is borne of collaboration and accountability. One result of this 
orientation is a degree of accountability to get the stories right, to offer thick 
description of social movement activity and the normative frameworks that undergird 
such activity. As we write about the lived experience of the people engaged in 
movement work and organizing from an orientation that grounds us in a collective 
project, we are simultaneously accountable to them. This stance of solidarity changes 
the work of legal scholarship itself.  
 
Clinical legal scholars have cultivated solidarity in robust ways over the last 
decade, engaging in a “collective critical stance” grounded in lived realities.197 Many 
clinical legal scholars have unearthed potential for transformative change through their 
clinical work alongside social movement organizations.198 These scholars recognize 
that regnant forms of public interest legal practice reinstantiate the lawyerly idea of the 
client’s individuated “problem” in ways that undermine collective power-building. 
Clinical collaboration with collectives allows for cogeneration of collective 
understanding and strategizing for transformative change that speaks to the collective 
realities of poor, Black, brown, and indigenous people. This cogeneration then feeds 
into distinct modes of lawyering practice and scholarly projects.199  
 
197 See Wendy A. Bach & Sameer M. Ashar, Critical Theory and Clinical Stance, 26 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 81, 81-83 (2019). Ashar argues that social movement collaborations have the power to 
remake legal work, its strategies, and its possibilities. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and 
Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 357-59 (2008) (evaluating existing clinical legal 
education and emerging alternative models and their impact on the field of public interest law) 
[hereinafter Ashar, Law Clinics]; Sameer M. Ashar, Fieldwork and the Political, in TRANSFORMING 
THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 288, 
289-90 (SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOTT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
Ashar, Fieldwork and the Political] (describing the “many pedagogical opportunities created by 
collaborations with movement organizations”); Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic 
Lawyering in Clinical Practice, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 201, 203-06 (2016) (arguing for progressive 
reform of legal education emphasizing justice and cogeneration of solutions by lawyers and 
communities on the ground) [hereinafter Ashar, Deep Critique]. 
198 See Ashar, Fieldwork and the Political, supra note 197, at 288, 293 (arguing for clinical practice 
that aims to expose law students to the limits of law and the promise of alternative visions of 
socio-economic organization from grassroots organizers). 
199 See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, Political Lawyering for the 21st Century, 96 DENV. L. REV. 399, 
400-402 (2019) (describing how “[c]linical teaching’s signature pedagogical vehicle” fails to 
“effectively prepare students to address and combat structural or chronic inequality” and how 
clinical educators should expose students to “integrated advocacy”); Ramzi Kassem & Diala 
Shamas, Rebellious Lawyering in the Security State, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 671, 675-77 (2017) 
(describing collaborations with Muslim community organizers in New York against FBI and 
NYPD surveillance and harassment in the post 9/11 period); Jeena Shah, Rebellious Lawyering 
in Big Case Clinics, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 775, 776-80 (2017) (describing efforts to infuse critical 
concepts in human rights and impact litigation in clinical contexts); John Whitlow, Community 
Law Clinics in the Neoliberal City: Assessing CUNY’s Tenant Law and Organizing Project, 20 CUNY 
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But the methodology of movement law is not just for clinical professors, or 
for professors who formally engage in the “practice of law.” There are many forms of 
solidarity and engagement: paying close attention to the words and actions of social 
movements, reading and learning from both scholarly histories of left movements and 
movement toolkits and manifestos articulating their own histories and visions, and 
above all crediting the generation of those ideas within movement spaces. Movement 
law scholars should take the time to notice the collective struggle happening around 
us, or within the areas of law that we study. We should find out what groups are 
meeting in our local areas, and go to those meetings, or, if not, follow Twitter feeds of 
collectives of grassroots organizations. We should ask our peers what movements they 
seek wisdom from or work alongside. We should join in when we are moved to do so. 
And we must recognize that all of this is just a beginning. 
 
Movement law, then, provides a model for scholars to generate ideas in ways 
that are in conversation both with other scholars and with social movements. It 
diversifies the episteme, strategies, and community of ideas collectively building energy 
and power around social, political, and economic transformation. It allows us to 
engage explicitly with the inescapable politics of the scholarly and legal enterprise. It 
is possible and it is being done. In the next part, we explore why it is necessary. 
 
  
III.  Revisiting the Scholarly Stance 
 
In our commitment to working alongside grassroots social movements with 
particular visions for political, economic, social transformation, movement law may 
open up questions about what it means to be a legal “scholar” at all, in contrast to 
other possible identities: activist, movement lawyer, public interest lawyer, public 
intellectual. But legal scholarship has various traditions of normativity: approaches to 
scholarship that seek not just to describe the law, legal institutions, and how they play 
out in the world, but also to critique outcomes and to proscribe how law or legal 
institutions should behave.200 We agree with Robin West, who, in defending what she 
terms “impassioned normativity,” has argued that legal scholars should “embrac[e] the 
passionate root of justice, of our understanding of it, and hence of our normative 
scholarship.”201 Through movement law, we wish to expand modes of generating 
 
L. REV. 351, 352-55 (2017) (describing collaborations with organizers on eviction cases in New 
York). 
200 Normative legal scholarship is itself a contested terrain, and we do not jump full-on into 
that debate here. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 
808 (1991) (“The normative orientation is so dominant in legal thought that it is usually not 
noticed.”); Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 6, 
8 (2016) (describing various critiques of normative legal scholarship and concluding that “[f]or 
every critique, both inside and outside the academy, one can find its opposite, also forcefully 
voiced. Legal scholarship does not want for critics.”). 
201 West, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 16. 
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normative scholarship in particular ways: alongside grassroots social movements 
committed to racial, economic, social justice. 202  
 
In this Part, we address questions and potential criticisms of movement law in 
relation to traditional notions of what it means to be a legal scholar, recognizing that 
critical scholars who have come before us have also engaged with many of these 
questions.203 Like all methodologies, ours comes with risks: of losing objectivity, 
lacking rigor, or depending so much on current social configurations that lessons soon 
evaporate. We recognize these risks, but we defend the methodology as necessary if 
legal scholars are to work toward undoing the fundamentally undemocratic nature of 




Scholarly objectivity is a challenge oft put to scholars who study legal, political, 
or social change, racial and gender justice. On the one hand, as scholars we all aim for 
truth rather than opinion.204 On the other hand, objectivity is perpetually out of our 
grasp. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu famously challenged the notion of scholarly 
objectivity, but urged constant self-reflexivity with regard to our social positions and 
how those positions influence and reflect our own approaches to what we study.205 
 
202 In 2013, Martha Minow put together a “field guide” to archetypical forms of legal 
scholarship. Although her typology is not meant to be exhaustive, it does present a series of 
eight prominent ways that legal scholars can and do approach their work, including “doctrinal 
restatements,” “recasting projects,” “policy analysis,” empirical analyses (either that test a 
theory or explain and assess legal institutions), sociological and historical approaches, and 
critical projects. And, as she notes, these approaches can be combined. Martha 
Minow, Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65-69 (2013) 
(capitalization altered). 
203 See supra Part I.A; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer 
Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 459-60, 471 (1996) (examining the relationship 
between activism and lawyering, from the position of a clinical law professor). 
204 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Essay, Engaged Scholarship as Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 193, 193–94 (2010) (“Scholarship . . . is ideally imagined to be, in a word, 
disengaged. Its disengagement is believed to conduce to objectivity, meaning beginning from 
no preconceived position, taking no sides, pulled by no consequence or advocacy necessity, 
making no judgments of value.”).  
205 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Scholastic Point of View, 5 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 380, 381-88 
(1990) (explaining how factors like power, position, and prestige interact with forces and stakes 
unique to the academic community to influence the outcome of academic scholarship); Pierre 
Bourdieu & Loïc J.D. Wacquant, The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Chicago Workshop), in AN 
INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 60, 73-99 (1992); see generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
HOMO ACADEMICUS, at xi (Peter Collier trans., Polity Press 1988) (1984) (noting that 
sociologists who wish to “study [their] own world” must “exoticize the domestic”). 
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With this we agree: while objectivity is merely a cover for other concerns, movement 
law scholars must, like all legal scholars, remain self-reflexive in our work.206 
 
 Scholarship with normative commitments to social movements is biased. But 
this aspect of the methodology does not make it stand out. All legal scholarship is 
biased: inevitably our views of the law are shaped by our underlying moral 
understandings and commitments, by our experiences and social location. The most 
revered legal thinkers—those often viewed as objective and unbiased—generated their 
ideas from their own life experiences in particular institutional contexts,207 including 
through funding by and collaborations with groups with explicit political 
commitments.208 In this way, what passes as objective can often be regressive. The 
mantle of objectivity has its own profound status-quo-enhancing implications.209 
Indeed, for well over a century, legal scholars have unearthed ways in which our 
primary commitments to legal institutions and elites perpetuate social and political 
hierarchies.210 These observations have most often come from critical legal scholars, 
who have embraced bias and subjectivity as inevitable.211  
 
206 For a discussion of Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of self-reflexivity in sociology as applied to the 
theory-practice divide in lawyering and legal academia, see Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn 
Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 455, 464-67 (2010).  
207 See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561-66 (1984) (identifying a scholarly tradition of racial exclusion in 
scholarship on civil rights); J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme 
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 769-72 (1971) (defining a tradition of scholarly hostility to the 
Warren court’s judicial responses to injustice). 
208 See, e.g., Robert Van Horn, Corporations and the Rise of Chicago Law and Economics, 47 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 477, 477-78, 481-87 (2018) (tracing the mutually beneficial relationship between large 
corporations and law and economics scholars at the University of Chicago in the mid-
twentieth century). 
209 See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 16, at 1806 (arguing that law and economics-focused 
legal scholarship in the twentieth century “lost the ability to see certain commitments in our 
law . . . as either reflecting or calling forth certain kinds of political values, or as taking a side 
in disputes that were inevitably struggles for power. That move . . . expressed a particular view 
of power and legitimacy, one that viewed market ordering as tending to diffuse and neutralize 
power and as earning legitimacy by producing both a wealthy society and an appropriately 
constrained state.”). 
210 Cf. Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 213, 213 (2017) (“For over a century, American legal scholars have participated in the 
realist project, understanding law not as an autonomous, independent system of rules, akin to 
geometry, but as the product of heated political, economic, and societal conflicts.”). 
211 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of 
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 830 (1994) 
(“The neutral principles or process that critics seek to enforce against feminists and scholars 
of color is based on the existence of a scholarly community whose intellectual values are 
synonymous (majoritarian) and exclusive of the Feminist Voice and the Voice of Color.”); cf. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3735538
Movement Law  Dec. 2020 Draft 
52 
 
We should be as cognizant of our own biases as ever, situated as we are at the 
dawn of political ferment and change. Our challenge is to approach our scholarship 
openly: We are committed to certain visions of liberation, solidarity, and equality. And 
we aim to avoid “scholarmush”: a combination of descriptive and normative claims 
that fails to explicitly name its political or moral commitments.212 We are not claiming 
that we have always been successful ourselves in making these distinctions. But we 
have come to believe that they are critical. In this call for transparency in our social 
and political orientations, we are inspired by “outsider” scholars, including in Critical 
Race Theory, Feminist Legal Theory, LatCrit, and OutCrit, who have demonstrated 
the value of a scholarly stance that names itself as directly engaged in the lived realities 
of the world, in inequality, racism, and patriarchy, in the violence of the law.213 
MacKinnon emphasizes this in searing terms that resonate for us: “to attempt to be 
truly disengaged is to strain to say so little that one’s scholarship weighs nothing at all 
on the scale of the legal quotidian. What an ambition. Imagine not only what is ossified 
but what is lost because of it.”214 
 
In contravention to the common sense in law that the embrace of politics is 
the end of analysis, we believe it is a beginning. As a result, we do not evade but rather 
embrace the politics of what we do as scholars, teachers, and lawyers. We believe the 
politics of law are central questions that scholars should take head on. Embracing the 
politics of law reorients—arguably reveals—the terrain of analysis, the subjects, 
objects, and processes of research and solidarity. It allows us to better understand 
 
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 543 (1988) (“Liberal and 
critical theorists . . . do not disagree about the possibility of generating legitimate moral 
commitments or normative discourse. We do disagree, in fundamental ways, about how to 
conceptualize and engage in moral inquiry and conversation.”). 
212 Adam J. Kolber, How to Fix Legal Scholarmush, 95 IND. L.J. 1191, 1193-94 (2020) (coining 
the term “scholarmush” and arguing that “[legal] scholars must be more clear, transparent, 
and rigorous about the extent to which their claims are descriptive as opposed to normative 
(and what sort of normativity is at issue.)”); cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“Too much legal scholarship ignores the rules of inference and 
applies instead the “rules” of persuasion and advocacy. These ‘rules’ have an important place 
in legal studies, but not when the goal is to learn about the empirical world.”). 
213 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 3-14; Daria Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst: The 
Assault on Radicals in American Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1658, 1663 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL 
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH 
IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323-24 (1989) (defining the term “outsider 
jurisprudence”); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074–
75 (1989) (describing the methodology of focusing on narrative in legal scholarship as one that 
brings out the perspectives of outsiders excluded from our reigning understandings of law and 
legal theory); Valdes, supra note 34, at 377-78 n.4 (“These genres of outsider jurisprudence 
have in common an outsider, and often times critical, perspective vis-à-vis law and society.”). 
214 MacKinnon, supra note 204, at 201. 
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inequality and explore new pathways for change in solidarity and in conversation with 
others outside the academy.  
 
As a scholarly methodology, movement law is not necessarily restricted to 
collaboration with and learning from left and progressive social movements. Much like 
movement lawyers, scholars of movement law must be self-conscious about the 
process through which they choose particular coalitions to support.215 This process 
must be grounded by reflection tied not just to movements, but also to larger political 
commitments. For us, this requires attention to the layers of subordination that 
structure material realities, and a focus on movements that hope to transform both 
those layers and those realities.216  
 
How one chooses the social movement actors and ideas that match one’s 
political commitments is difficult, in part because the process is so iterative: to be 
engaged with social movement ideations is so often to be moved to shift one’s moral 
understandings of the world; and to think and write about those understandings in 
dialogue with movement actors is in turn to co-create new theories of change, and 
potentially to critique existing methods and ideas on the ground. This is praxis.217 
 
This praxis, in turn, requires constant self-reflexivity of the kind Bourdieu 
described. As part of our position within elite institutions, we risk reinforcing 
hierarchies even as we name them and try to dismantle them.218 And, on the other end, 
accountability to movements must not mean an unquestioning following of those 
 
215 Cf. Ashar, supra note 99, at 1490 (placing “the actions of activists and their lawyers in the 
fight for immigrant rights within the socio-legal framework of law and resistance”). 
216 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing our commitment to left social 
movements). The methodology of movement law could potentially be taken up by someone 
in solidarity with a right-leaning social movement. And yet, because movement law focuses 
on broadscale transformative possibilities, it is both less likely to happen and less likely to 
have a formative impact. Cf. Farbman, supra note 11 at 1937-39 (making similar arguments 
with respect to his theory of resistance lawyering, for which critical thinking from the left is 
what “supplies the latent political power to the project of resistance lawyering in the first 
place”). 
217 See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt, A Dialectic of Theory and Practice, 12 CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 19, 
19-23 (2016) (describing how Michel Foucault’s politics and theories dialectically influenced 
each other, during the period in which Foucault was involved deeply in the movement effort 
Le Groupe d’information sur les prisons (the Prisons Information Group)). This mandate also 
evokes organizer Mary Hook’s mandate for Black people, which includes being “willing to be 
transformed in service of the work.” Southerners on New Ground, The Mandate: A Call and 
Response from Black Lives Matter Atlanta, at 2:36 (July 14, 2016), 
https://southernersonnewground.org/themandate/.  
218 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 15 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 
2000) (“[T]he suspension of economic or social necessity . . . in the absence of special vigilance 
[by scholars] . . . threatens to confine scholastic thought within the limits of ignored or 
repressed presuppositions, implied in the withdrawal from the world.”) 
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movements’ ideas.219 Scholars interested in movement law should be vigilant about 
these concerns through ongoing introspective and outward-looking critique.220 
 
To engage in movement law is therefore to write in solidarity with movement 
actors with particular stances and commitments, and to recognize that solidarity 
requires reflexive analysis.221 Critiques of social movements should come from 
engagement with particular social movement spaces, rather than declarations from afar 
and on high. Critiques should be borne of a recognition of shared commitments rather 
than a “gotcha.” This should include an awareness of one’s own positionality, a 




Like all legal scholarship, movement law aims to engage in rigorous analysis of 
the law. Scholarship must take care to choose its subject and methods, and engage in 
those methods with diligence. Analytical rigor in legal scholarship consists of “precise 
questions, correct frameworks, technical answers, and logical conclusions.”222 One 
concern with movement law may be that without defined parameters it could veer into 
something more akin to reporting or opinion writing.223 In order to maintain rigor, 
then, scholars engaged in movement law must combine their urgent quest to co-
generate ideas alongside social movements with a deep commitment to the slow, 
 
219 Scholars of social movements have long been critically engaged with the place of the scholar 
in relation to the social movements we study. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 43 (describing the 
“distinctive theme in Continental social movement scholarship [of] the self-conscious concern 
with the scholar's own role in the social movements that she studies.”). 
220 For a scholarly critique in conversation with movement ideation, see Jamelia N. 
Morgan, Disability’s Fourth Amendment 9, 12 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Stanford Law Review) (describing “[t]he erasure of disability in movements” against police 
violence). See also  Disability Solidarity: Completing the “Vision for Black Lives,” HARRIET TUBMAN 
COLLECTIVE, (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://harriettubmancollective.tumblr.com/post/150072319030/htcvision4blacklives 
(criticizing the Movement for Black Lives’ Vision for Black Lives for “not once mention[ing] 
disability, ableism, audism or the unspeakable violence and Black death found at the 
intersection of ableism, audism, and anti-Black racism”).  
221 Indeed, legal scholars with different political commitments can still use our methodology – 
for example, someone might generate ideas alongside the Tea Party, or even the Alt-Right. 
That scholarship might suffer from a particular bias, in that one can imagine scholarship that 
implicitly or explicitly upholds tenets of white supremacy or patriarchy. But such scholarship 
cannot be rejected simply on the grounds that it is political or aligned with social movements. 
222 Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self, 
40 HOW. L.J. 1, 15 n.54 (1996). 
223 For an articulation of the goals of legal scholarship, see Orin S. Kerr, Blogs and the Legal 
Academy, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2006), stating that the goals include  “shed[ing]light 
in an important and lasting way on the function, purposes, meaning, and impact of the legal 
system and the role of law in society.” 
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difficult work of producing writing that reflects the nuanced legal and social worlds 
that we inhabit. 
 
The debate in the early 1990s and beyond over the use of narrative and 
storytelling in critical legal scholarship is instructive for thinking through rigor. During 
that period, CRT, feminist legal studies, and other critical traditions used narrative, 
including first-person narrative, as a device to denaturalize legal and social 
arrangements that conventional forms of scholarship did not question.224 Critical 
scholars endured accusations that their methods lacked rigor,225 and defended those 
accusations with renewed methodological commitments.226 Patricia Williams, for 
 
224 See generally Scheppele, supra note 213, at 2074–75; Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 
79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 982 (1991) (examining “feminist narrative scholarship as a distinctive 
form of legal argument.”); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989) (“Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives 
are powerful means for destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received 
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political 
discourse takes place.”); see also Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action 
Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382, 2409 (1989) (telling a hypothetical story about the effect of 
Michigan Law Review’s storytelling issue as his contribution to Michigan Law Review’s storytelling 
issue). 
225 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1801-08 (arguing that 
critical race theorists are wrong to claim a uniquely valuable perspective for scholars of color—
to claim “racial status as an intellectual credential,” in Kennedy’s words); Richard A. Posner, 
The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN 
AMERICAN LAW (1997)) (critiquing the “identity politics” of the “postmodern left” in legal 
academia); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal 
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 852-53 (1993) (critiquing the “validity” of the forms of 
narrative storytelling found in feminist legal theory and critical race theory). 
226 For a summary of these critiques, see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical 
Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door”, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1365-70 (2002), describing 
the “media reports that CRT truly is [a] backward, racist, unsophisticated assortment of half-
baked scholarship.” See also Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1215, 1218 (2002) (describing how “CRT . . . has often been characterized as (or 
caricatured and reduced to) nothing more than relativism and narratives”); Larry Alexander, 
What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1888-97 (1993); Jane B. Baron, 
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) (describing “the sudden, and rather 
vehement, resistance to legal storytelling”); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review 
Stories, 63 COLO. L. REV. 683, 683-89 (1992) (arguing that outside scholarship and its 
storytelling are the future of scholarship); Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical 
Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1239-1340 (1995) (discussing 
mainstream legal discourse’s rejection of outsider perspectives as related to the universal 
human experience); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 665, 665-76 (1993) (countering Farber and Sherry’s assessment of outsider 
scholarship); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of 
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 807 (1994) 
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example, described student editors’ requests for her to omit reference to her own race 
in her scholarship—in service to “principles of neutrality.227 As Daria Roithmayr 
explains, to defend narrative in legal scholarship is to make “the radical argument that 
the choice of which stories are ‘accurate,’ ‘valid’ or ‘good scholarship’ is a political 
choice, [that] requires the suppression or marginalization of alternative 
‘counterstories’….”228  
 
Just as critical scholars deployed and defended storytelling to advance their 
arguments, so too do we seek to elevate movement-based narratives that stem from 
everyday precarity and collective analysis. These movement narratives help 
denaturalize the status quo and make another world seem within reach. Movement law 
does not necessarily center narrative. But it often does in part because storytelling is 
central to what social movements do. 
 
Indeed, a meta-insight of critical scholarship is that judgments of rigor are 
themselves political.229 To bring this observation to our own method: those who 
believe that the rule of law is neutral and  objective—separate from our political and 
social arrangements, from white supremacy, and from gender and class hierarchies—
are unlikely to be persuaded by movement law scholarship. And those who believe we 
live in a robust democracy, who trust our current institutions of governance to 
represent all people fairly, are unlikely to be sympathetic to grassroots social 
movements demanding alternative visions. These scholars will likely leave 
unconvinced that it is possible to judge the rigor of scholarship that situates itself in 
solidarity with some of those alternative visions. 
 
 
(defending “the value inherent in Critical Race Theory and Narrative”); Philip C. Kissam, The 
Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 221-23, 244-51 (1988) (arguing that new 
pluralism in legal scholarship requires more evolved evaluation methodologies). On the 
development of measures of rigor, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact 
Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 390 (1996) (“[W]e need some safeguards to ensure that 
critical reflection supersedes preconscious prejudice, and to ensure equality of treatment.”); 
Francisco Valdes, Rebellious Knowledge Production, Academic Activism, & Outsider Democracy: From 
Principles to Practices in LatCrit Theory, 1995 to 2008, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 131, 138 (2009) 
(proposing “guideposts” for LatCrit and other outsider scholarship, “rooted in our 
jurisprudential legacy.”).  
227 Williams, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 48. 
228 Roithmayr, supra note 213, at 1671. 
229 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 226, at 393 (describing “the emptiness of the concepts of 
empathy and narrative when they are not constrained by extrinsic normative, political, or 
moral principles”); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 733 (“[A particular piece of scholarship] can be judged only 
by reference to a particular research tradition or scholarly paradigm,  . . . Yet conclusions at 
the level of what is valuable or interesting are very often dispositive in deciding which of two 
articles is better.”). 
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For those who are already on board with movement law’s orientation, in Part 
II we outline the requirements for rigorous work within this method.230 Moreover, we 
can imagine work that writes about social movement ideas that is not rigorous—
perhaps it does not engage adequately with context, or with ideas in movement spaces. 
Perhaps it does not bring up counterarguments or name difficulties with movement 
ideation. Perhaps there are not adequate citations to the collective genealogy of ideas, 
especially to writings of people at the center of struggle. To run through the four 
moves that we lay out in Part II is, we believe, to see a pathway to rigorous scholarship, 
as well as to see possible offramps to less rigorous forms of scholarly engagement with 




The self-reflexivity necessary for movement law requires maintaining 
awareness of one’s own position in relation to the social movements one studies. This 
awareness of positionality is in part about our professional identities—as law faculty, 
our professional identities shape our experiences, judgments, and scholarship. But it is 
also about maintaining an awareness of our social locations and how they shape our 
worldviews in more intersectional ways, including as to our race, class gender, 
sexuality, disability, and national origin. One can be situated as a clinical or doctrinal 
teacher, or a budding scholar who has yet to enter a classroom on the other side of the 
podium. The key is to maintain an awareness of that position and its relationship to 
one’s scholarship. In movement law, this can mean walking a tightrope of both deep 
engagement and solidarity with movement actors, and the distance required for 
nuanced scholarship and humble solidarity.  
 
A constant awareness of one’s own positionality is necessary because scholars 
can coopt social movements in unintended ways. There is always the risk that our own 
position as elites will distort social movement ideas toward legitimation of injustice.231 
As Aziza Ahmed reminds us in the context of reproductive justice struggles, social 
movements have splintered and sub-movements have formed when faced with elite-
driven efforts at law reform.232 Often “the pull towards mainstream issues and 
constitutional doctrine prevails.”233 This does not mean that as elites we should 
 
230 Cf. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 889, 889-91 (1992) (describing the need for criteria with which to evaluate different 
methods of legal scholarship, specific to each methodology). 
231 Cf. Lawrence, supra note 10, at 381, 387 (“When people’s movements successfully challenge 
and disrupt racist structures and institutions, and contest the narratives of racial subordination, 
the plunderers will respond with new law.”). 
232 See Aziza Ahmed, Social Movements in the Struggle for Redistribution, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT: 
LPE BLOG (Apr. 24, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/04/24/social-movements-in-the-
struggle-for-redistribution. In the reproductive justice context, the result was that “issues like 
HIV that continue to disproportionately impact largely poor, Black, and Latina women are left 
off of the mainstream reproductive rights agenda.” Id. 
233 Id. 
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abandon attempts to co-produce dynamic ideation. Instead, we should engage social 
movements as collaborators, not seers.234 When there is splintering, we need to make 
choices with the information and relationships we hold in that moment, without 
defaulting to frameworks of relegitimation. 
 
We should be mindful and engaged about how our professional and other 
identities, including race, gender, class, sexuality, and disability, may impact how one 
shows up in movement spaces, and how those identities shape what it means to engage 
in solidarity.235 Questions like how much space to take up, whether one’s role is in the 
background or foreground, are central. Our identities matter, not as signifiers in and 
of themselves, but as having been formed socially through the interaction of systems 
of power and wealth that endow some with the presumptions of intelligence, while 
marginalizing and diminishing others.236 Stepping forward to make contributions in 
movement spaces can be risky, but so too can hanging back and only observing and 
writing. This is the case both when we are engaged in collaborations across identities, 
as well as when we may be working in the communities from which we ourselves may 
have come.237 It is our responsibility to resist habits of intellectual extraction and 
exploitation.238 
 
Collective struggle is a necessary part of building a more just and free future, 
in part because elite rule is a central problem for democracy. When we do not engage 
in these collective projects, we have no hope of redistributing power or resources, we 
 
234 See Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly 
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 573-74 (1984) (“The radical 
law teacher’s responsibility is not simply to expose doctrinal incoherencies and build historical 
accounts. . . It is to point the way to a different kind of practice, one which utilizes that 
historical account. . . It is a practice located ‘out there,’ in the world outside the law school, 
where injustice, legal procedures and programs, incipient protest, and social movement 
constantly intermingle.”); see also Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: 
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 377-78 
(1982-83) (stating that radical lawyers “build the power of popular movements”). 
235 Intersectionality offers an intellectual framework by which social movements integrate its 
membership and generate power. See Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw & Leslie 
McCall, Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785, 
801 (2013) (“One set of questions has to do with how identities, awareness, and transformation 
are fostered within organizations that attend to a diverse array of issues and power differentials 
among members.”); ERIN MAYO-ADAM, QUEER ALLIANCES: HOW POWER SHAPES 
POLITICAL MOVEMENT FORMATION (2020) (examining local intersectional alliances within 
the immigrant rights, queer and trans, and labor rights movements). 
236 See generally White, To Learn and Teach,  supra note 70, at 752-54; Michael Grinthal, Power 
With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 33-44 (2011). 
237 Cf. Julie D. Lawton, Am I My Client? Revisited: The Role of Race in Intra-Race Legal 
Representation, 22 Mich. J. Race & L. 13, 42-50 (2016) (describing the challenges of same-race 
legal representation). 
238 See Zuni Cruz, supra note 122 at 233-35 (on scholarly appropriation and the call for non-
exploitation).  
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hoard them for ourselves, we fight for the status quo, sometimes unwittingly. When 
we do engage collectively and accountably, there are challenges and limits, 
undoubtedly, to our engagement as elites. But there is greater potential when we take 
the contradictions head on, when we pay attention to the material conditions of people 
and the world, and we work in solidarity with people outside of the academy. 
IV. Legal Scholarship and Radical Possibility 
 
Even as the long, slow work of organizing continues, this decade’s surge of 
movement activity and grassroots contestation may soon begin to ebb. We can be 
assured that defenses of the current order—on the white supremacist right, in the 
diversity and inclusion center, amongst cultural conservatives and business elites—will 
remain vigorous. We see this dynamic in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd 
in Minneapolis. As street protesters pull back from the violent police reaction to 
demonstrations, police unions are reasserting their power239 and politicians retreat on 
early pledges to defund the police.240 As scholars invested in transforming our political, 
economic, and social order, what are we to do?241 
 
 One contribution that we can make is the development of movement law 
scholarship. We agree with Matsuda’s admonition that “since legal scholars will never 
be the center of any successful movement for social change, if we believe that change 
is necessary, we must build coalitions with others.”242 However, our lack of centrality 
does not permit us to abdicate space. It is incumbent on legal scholars to document, 
critique, and advance grassroots struggle in an era where so many are reinforcing the 
democratic deficit at the heart of our system.  
 
Movement law facilitates cogeneration of ideas necessary for largescale change. 
Legal scholars are assimilated into an intellectual universe that assumes its own primacy 
in debates about the construction and governance of the social. Movement law 
disrupts our uncritical incorporation into that universe. All three of us—and the 
scholars we discuss throughout this Article—have found direction and meaning from 
our engagement with social movement organizations, broadly defined.243 Our 
collaborations have allowed us to see aspects of our political, economic, and social 
 
239 See Sam Adler-Bell, How Police Unions Bully Politicians, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/159706/police-unions-bully-politicians-new-york-deblasio 
(noting multiple examples of police intimidation of elected officials). 
240 See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon, How a Pledge to Dismantle the Minneapolis Police Collapsed, THE 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2S0hDRJ (discussing the retreat of 
Minneapolis city council members from their pledge to defund police). 
241 Cf. HARCOURT, supra note 82, at 466-503 (asking “What more am I to do?” and 
describing how injustice should perhaps be one’s primary motivator when engaging with and 
being on the side of social change). 
242 Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 52, at 349. 
243 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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order that are hidden in legal academic discourse. Our immersion in organizing spaces 
has given us a lens through which to see people who are often ignored in that 
discourse. We have sought to integrate movement ideas, strategies, and horizons in 
our academic work on law and lawyering. We have named movement thinkers and 
grassroots leaders who have nurtured new ways of knowing and doing. We, in turn, 
have made modest contributions to those movements in the course of our work with 
them.  
 
Movement activity has stimulated tectonic rumblings in certain fields of law. 
In the last decade, organizers and allied scholars are questioning the liberal nationalist 
underpinnings of immigration law and the ostensible “nation of immigrants” narrative 
which serves as a cover for colonialism and settlement as well as a system of mass 
detention and deportation. In criminal law, the Movement for Black Lives and 
abolitionist organizing have put police violence and impunity—and now the failures 
of reform—at the center of academic discourse. How might movement law ripple 
across other fields of law? How might we challenge the restricted scope of center-right 
academic debate in most fields of law? 
 
When we write to identify and support the horizons of progressive and left 
movements, we contribute to seeding policy discourse with radical aims and means. 
Movements are coopted, contained, and channeled when they attempt to translate 
long-term organizing and mobilizing into policy programs. Elected officials and 
bureaucracies appear to respond to mobilizations while altering as little as possible. 
They say that we cannot do what is being demanded by the movement because of 
conventional interpretations of law. This furthers  a form of political austerity that 
devastates poor and working class people by foreclosing real change. Movement law 
helps our organizational collaborators protect their most far-reaching aspirations. 
Rather than scholarship being “pull[ed] by the policy audience,”244 movement law has 
the capacity to resist compromise and prevent the dilution of movement programs of 
structural social change. Movement law can help to sustain policy shifts and make 
them more politically durable.245 
 
 When we write alongside movements, we incrementally transform the 
discourse in which we participate. The lenses provided by social movements have the 
capacity to change what we study and how we study it. When movement law makes 
the academy permeable to movement influence, we challenge and alter academic 
discourse and we transform legal education.246 It is beyond the bounds of this Article, 
focused squarely on the production of legal scholarship, to explore the role of social 
 
244 Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL. 97 (1988). 
245 See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 133 (on entrenching social change through changes 
to institutional and policy-making arrangements).  
246 Supra note 99. 
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movements in the transformation of legal pedagogy.247 However, it is important to 
note that lawyers are trained to integrate bodies of knowledge that shift over time. 
When movement law alters bodies of knowledge to incorporate radical grassroots 
ideation and experimentation, we change how lawyers are trained, how they practice, 
and with whom. Movements enable lawyers to practice with a new, critical 
understanding of the plasticity and contestation of legal frameworks in their fields of 
specialization. Movement law enables law teachers to train cadres of lawyers prepared 
to support organizers and communities.  
Legal scholars and lawyers are not the protagonists in movement struggles for 
progressive social change.248 But law has constrained change and facilitated violence 
against working people, poor people, people of color, migrants, and youth, amongst 
many others. Legal scholars and practitioners have a responsibility to abate the 
violence of law and, in the most optimal cases, draw on movement struggle to 
transform the construction and governance of our polities. Movement law offers a 
means by which we may uphold our responsibility and make good use of our relative 
privilege—in service of transformation and redistribution. 
Conclusion 
 
By the time that Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd 
in May 2020 and the country erupted into a national uprising against police violence 
amidst an ongoing pandemic, sustained social movement contestation had made the 
ground ripe for demands that took aim at the very structure of our government: 
defund the police and defend Black lives.249 The radicality of the demand took many 
in law and policy circles by surprise. But for scholars who study social movement 
ideation, campaigns, and prefigurative politics, the surprise lay in only how quickly the 
idea took hold within the massive uprisings across the country. Because we were 
already engaged in movement law, we were familiar with abolitionist frameworks to 
defund and dismantle the police, and to build communities of care and systems of 
provision. We knew the decades of social movement labor behind it: organizing, 
debating, political education. We were ready to be a part of this change, to support it, 
to engage in loving critique that strengthens rather than undermines because it comes 
from a place of solidarity.  
 
This is the promise and the urgency of movement law: as legal scholars, to 
situate ourselves in solidarity with social movements is to be a part of long-term, 
radical, collective rethinkings of social, political, and legal arrangements. And it is also 
 
247 We have attempted to do this in prior work, separately and together. See Akbar, Law’s 
Exposure, supra note 1007;  GUERRILLA GUIDES TO LAW TEACHING, supra note 200; Ashar, 
Law Clinics, Fieldwork and the Political, and Deep Critique, supra note 202.  
248 Jennifer Gordon, Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 2133 (2007). 
249 Akbar, supra note 27.  
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to be ready when the big changes happen, in swells of social movement energy and 
uprisings whose timing we cannot always predict. As legal scholars, we can be a part 
of collectively transforming these swells of power-building into durable, structural 
change. But we can only do so from a stance of solidarity. The choice is ours. 
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